Is Calendly Set Up (1).vbs safe?
The VBS script received a malicious sandbox assessment after launching concealed PowerShell, contacting download infrastructure, and exhibiting process-injection and credential-access indicators.
A completed sandbox run found hostile loader behavior, including hidden PowerShell with execution-policy bypass, remote script and ScreenConnect installer retrieval, and offensive techniques T1055 and T1485. Fortinet and TrendMicro also flagged the script among 4 of 75 engines, supporting the runtime findings despite limited family consensus.
27d6275671f259d39f…4f496b3bfebb99Recommended next actions
Before running
Do not run it. Delete this file from the device, then empty the Recycle Bin or Trash.
If you already ran it
Disconnect from the internet, start a full or offline antivirus scan, then secure important accounts from a clean device.
Intelligence
The saved assessment, checked against the scan evidence and recorded coverage.
The reasoning behind this verdict
This section explains the evidence supporting the verdict and keeps conflicting or missing signals visible.
A completed sandbox run found hostile loader behavior, including hidden PowerShell with execution-policy bypass, remote script and ScreenConnect installer retrieval, and offensive techniques T1055 and T1485. Fortinet and TrendMicro also flagged the script among 4 of 75 engines, supporting the runtime findings despite limited family consensus.
The strongest evidence is a completed sandbox run that returned a malicious assessment. During execution, the script invoked concealed PowerShell with execution-policy bypass and accessed URLs serving a PowerShell installer and ScreenConnect setup package. Runtime mappings included T1055 and T1485, while separate heuristic evidence recorded LSASS targeting and system reconnaissance. Fortinet and TrendMicro contributed two independent tier-1 detections among 4 of 75 engines, although the engines did not reach strong agreement on one family. The file is also newly observed with no established benign history, reinforcing the risk posed by the runtime behavior.
What We Detected
Four of 75 antivirus engines flagged this VBS script. Tier-1 detections included Fortinet's VBS/MALD2.E883!tr and TrendMicro's HEUR_VBS.DL1, while Skyhigh described VBS dropper behavior. The family attribution is not strongly agreed upon, but the detection profile consistently points toward a script-based downloader or dropper.
Threat Behavior
A completed sandbox run returned a malicious assessment. The script launched hidden PowerShell with execution-policy bypass, contacted a URL serving installer.ps1, and retrieved a ScreenConnect ClientSetup MSI from a separate domain. Recorded offensive techniques included T1055 and T1485, and additional evidence indicated LSASS targeting and reconnaissance with whoami. The host-reputation cross-check covered only three hosts, fewer than the distinct runtime contacts, so no complete reputation result is available for all observed network destinations.
What To Do Now
Do not run the script or any downloaded PowerShell, MSI, or ScreenConnect component. Keep endpoint protection enabled, quarantine the file, and investigate affected systems for unauthorized remote-access software, PowerShell activity, credential exposure, and related network connections.
Where this verdict could be wrong4 caveats
- Only 4/75 engines detected the file, and engines.tier1FamilyConsensus.strong=false; the MALD2 family attribution is therefore not strongly corroborated.
- contactedHosts.inspected=3 found zero cached malicious or suspicious hosts, although the runtime contact list includes more distinct domains and IP addresses than were inspected.
- droppedChildren.hasMaliciousChild=false, but the single inspected child remained unclassified rather than receiving a benign result.
- externalIntel.yaraify.ruleCount=0 and externalIntel.malwareBazaar.hit=false, providing no researcher-rule or repository corroboration.
These are the assessment's weak points. If you believe one applies to your file, report the verdict and we'll re-review it.
- Only 4/75 antivirus engines reported detections.
- No strong tier-1 family consensus was established.
- No inspected child was confirmed malicious.
- Three inspected contacted hosts had no cached malicious or suspicious classifications.
- YARAify and MalwareBazaar returned no corroborating hits.
- One completed sandbox returned a malicious assessment.
- Hidden PowerShell used execution-policy bypass.
- Runtime evidence mapped activity to T1055 and T1485.
- Evidence indicated LSASS targeting consistent with credential-access attempts.
- The script downloaded PowerShell and ScreenConnect installation content.
- Two independent tier-1 engines flagged the sample.
Quarantine and remove the script without executing it, while keeping endpoint protection enabled. If it already ran, isolate the device and investigate PowerShell, ScreenConnect, LSASS access, credentials, and all observed network destinations.
Coverage & freshness
Complete means the check returned a usable result. It does not mean the file is safe.
Antivirus
Complete4 of 75 engines flagged the file.
Sandbox
Complete1 isolated runtime environment contributed observations.
Network
Partial3 of 9 contacted hosts were cross-checked; coverage is incomplete.
YARA
Complete5 signature or behavior rules matched.
External intel
Complete3 of 3 independent reference sources completed.
Behavior
Plain-English impact first, then the observed runtime evidence.
Runtime flight recorder
Capture complete- 1isolated sandbox run
- 14MITRE ATT&CK techniques
- 15spawned processes
- 11network contacts
- 9filesystem & mutex artifacts
What this file does
Observed actions and their security significance
High concern: Injected code into another process, a technique that can conceal execution.
Moderate concern: Contained obfuscated or packed code that makes inspection harder.
Moderate concern: Runs hidden system commands (script or shell).
Moderate concern: Communicated over a common application protocol; malware can use this for command-and-control.
Moderate concern: Scans through your files and folders.
Note: Reads your Windows user-account details.
Note: Collects details about your system.
These are observed capabilities from an isolated analysis. A technique does not prove malicious intent on its own, and the file never ran on your device.
Threat context
How downloaders work
This file is a delivery vehicle. On its own it can look small and harmless, but its job is to quietly pull down and install the REAL payload — often a stealer, ransomware, or bot — from a server the attacker controls.
Bottom line:Because the dangerous part arrives later, early scans can look cleaner than the threat really is.
Attack story
Runtime observations grouped by analysis stage. Arrows organize the stages; they do not claim chronology or causality.
Input file
The submitted object
- FileObserved
Calendly Set Up (1).vbs
27d6275671f259d39f18a36807500859998ea1a358b063fd084f496b3bfebb99
01Uploaded file
Processes
Runtime execution
- ProcessObserved
Observed process
"C:\Windows\system32\wscript.exe" "C:\Users\<USER>\Desktop\Calendly Set Up _1_.vbs"
02Isolated runtime analysis - ProcessObserved
Observed process
whoami /groups
03Isolated runtime analysis - +1 more recorded observation in Analyst mode
Files
Created or changed
- Written fileObserved
CabEFEF.tmp
C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\CabEFEF.tmp
04Isolated runtime analysis - Written fileObserved
TarEFF0.tmp
C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\TarEFF0.tmp
05Isolated runtime analysis - +1 more recorded observation in Analyst mode
Network
Hosts contacted
- Contacted hostObserved
gempull1.b-cdn.net
Contact observed during runtime.
06Isolated runtime analysis - Contacted hostObserved
admin.ferrypie.top
Contact observed during runtime.
07Isolated runtime analysis - +1 more recorded observation in Analyst mode
7 recorded facts from one runtime window. Every fact remains independently traceable in Analyst mode.
What this file did when executed
This file was detonated in 1 sandbox; 1 returned "malicious".
Adversary techniques mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
- gempull1.b-cdn.net
- admin.ferrypie.top
- atm.teams.mira.tm.svc.cloud.microsoft
- 212.102.40.113
- 104.21.94.120
- 8.8.8.8
- 37.19.207.38
- 199.232.210.172
- 162.159.36.2
- https://gempull1.b-cdn.net/installer.ps1
- https://admin.ferrypie.top/Bin/ScreenConnect.ClientSetup.msi?e=Access&y=Guest&c=remmy&c=&c=&c=&c=&c=&c=&c=
- HKEY_USERS\S-1-5-21-4270068108-2931534202-3907561125-1001\Software\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\FileExts\.exe\OpenWithProgids\exefile
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\CabEFEF.tmp
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\TarEFF0.tmp
- C:\ProgramData\ScreenConnect\Deployment\20261005_084033\Install-ScreenConnect.ps1
- C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Caches
- \Device\ConDrv\\Connect
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\CabEFEF.tmp
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\TarEFF0.tmp
- Global\OneSettingQueryMutex+compat+encapsulation
Files this sample writes at runtime
This file drops 1 child at runtime. None are currently flagged malicious in our cache.
- df4987c4165962804a27…3315ffNever scannednever seen before
Detection & Forensics
Consensus, attribution, signatures, code structure, prevalence, and identity.
Evidence integrity
Chain of custody for the facts preserved in this report.
- 5rule hits recorded
- 4 / 75engines flagged
- 1sources in submission history
Why these facts are shown
Each statement identifies whether it was directly recorded or derived from saved scan facts.
- 01
1 isolated runtime environment classified the observed behavior as malicious.
Verdict inputView chapterProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 02
1 high-confidence signature or behavior rule matched this file.
Verdict inputView chapterProvenanceDerivedSourceSignature and behavior rulesObserved at - 03
4 of 75 antivirus engines flagged the file, including Fortinet and Skyhigh.
Verdict inputView chapterProvenanceObservedSourceAntivirus analysisObserved at - 04
Scanned file: Calendly Set Up (1).vbs — 27d6275671f259d39f18a36807500859998ea1a358b063fd084f496b3bfebb99
ProvenanceObservedSourceUploaded fileObserved at - 05
Observed process — "C:\Windows\system32\wscript.exe" "C:\Users\<USER>\Desktop\Calendly Set Up _1_.vbs"
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 06
Observed process — whoami /groups
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 07
File written: CabEFEF.tmp — C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\CabEFEF.tmp
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 08
File written: TarEFF0.tmp — C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\TarEFF0.tmp
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 09
Contacted host: gempull1.b-cdn.net — Contact observed during runtime.
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 10
Contacted host: admin.ferrypie.top — Contact observed during runtime.
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at
Detection sources at a glance
Category: downloader
MalwareBazaar, YARAify, and CIRCL hashlookup completed and returned no entries for this hash.
Signatures and behavior heuristics
A community signature or high-severity behavioral heuristic matched. Signatures identify known patterns; heuristics are strong leads but are not proof on their own.
Sample spawned PowerShell with a hidden window AND execution-policy bypass / inline command. Not definitive — legit Intune/SCCM scripts do this too — but combined with other signals it reinforces the loader profile.
EvidenceC:\Windows\System32\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe -NoLogo -NoProfile -NonInteractive -WindowStyle Hidden -ExecutionPolicy Bypass -File C:\ProgramData\ScreenConnect\Deployment\20261005_084033\Install-ScreenConnec…The saved runtime evidence maps this activity to MITRE T1055 (Process Injection). The mapping supports possible process injection, but it does not prove the exact injection method or the operator's intent.
EvidenceC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -pSandbox observed process activity targeting LSASS (Windows credential store). Legitimate software has no business reading LSASS memory — this is Mimikatz-shape behaviour.
EvidenceC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeSample ran reconnaissance commands. On its own this is weak signal — admin scripts do this too — but combined with other red flags it fills in an attacker profile.
EvidencewhoamiSample contacted a TLD (.top) whose registries are dominated by cheap, short-lifetime malware infrastructure. Legit services rarely use these.
Evidenceadmin.ferrypie.top
4 of 75 engines flagged this file
View all 75 engine results
PE structure
Not applicablePE structure analysis applies to Windows executable formats, not this file type.
How widely this file has been seen
Barely seen in the wild and first surfaced recently. 4 antivirus detections make that low prevalence materially relevant, but rarity alone is not proof of malware.
Fingerprint and provenance
- File name
- Calendly Set Up (1).vbs
- Format
- VBA
- Code signing
- Not applicable to this file type
- Size
- 6.7 KB
- Last analyzed
- Oct 6, 2026, 1:20 AM UTC
27d6275671f259d39f18a36807500859998ea1a358b063fd084f496b3bfebb99Safety & FAQ
Complete recovery guidance and answers for the next decision.
What to do now
This file is dangerous. Treat it as harmful and remove it.
- Recovery step 01
Don't run this file. Delete this file from the device, then empty the Recycle Bin or Trash.
- Recovery step 02
If you already ran it, disconnect from the internet and start with a full antivirus scan or Microsoft Defender Offline scan. If compromise is suspected or the problem persists, use a reputable second-opinion scanner and follow incident-recovery or clean-reinstall guidance.
- Recovery step 03
If you typed any passwords while it was open, change them from a device you trust.
- Recovery step 04
Get a fresh copy from the developer's official site or an official app store.
Safety FAQ
Direct answers grounded in the saved verdict and evidence in this report.
Is Calendly Set Up (1).vbs a virus?
What is Calendly Set Up (1).vbs?
How many antivirus engines detected Calendly Set Up (1).vbs?
What should I do if I already ran Calendly Set Up (1).vbs?
How do I remove Calendly Set Up (1).vbs?
What kind of malware is Calendly Set Up (1).vbs?
What is the SHA-256 hash of Calendly Set Up (1).vbs?
How up to date is this analysis of Calendly Set Up (1).vbs?
Community
Member reviews and reports for this exact file hash.