Is &Bill of Lading (BL).vbs safe?
Malicious file assessment
1 high-confidence signature or behavior rule matched this file.
37ffa3580a83f17052…ac95a4cc613b36Recommended next actions
Before running
Do not run it. Delete this file from the device, then empty the Recycle Bin or Trash.
If you already ran it
Disconnect from the internet, start a full or offline antivirus scan, then secure important accounts from a clean device.
Intelligence
The saved assessment, checked against the scan evidence and recorded coverage.
No saved analyst narrative
This report keeps the verified scan facts available below without inventing an analysis that was not saved with the scan.
Coverage & freshness
Complete means the check returned a usable result. It does not mean the file is safe.
Antivirus
Complete9 of 74 engines flagged the file.
Sandbox
Complete1 isolated runtime environment contributed observations.
Network
Partial4 of 9 contacted hosts were cross-checked; coverage is incomplete.
YARA
Complete4 signature or behavior rules matched.
External intel
Complete3 of 3 independent reference sources completed.
Behavior
Plain-English impact first, then the observed runtime evidence.
Runtime flight recorder
Capture complete- 1isolated sandbox run
- 38MITRE ATT&CK techniques
- 15spawned processes
- 17network contacts
- 33filesystem & mutex artifacts
What this file does
Observed actions and their security significance
High concern: Created or modified a scheduled task, which can provide persistence.
High concern: Injected code into another process, a technique that can conceal execution.
High concern: Encrypted files or data, behaviour commonly associated with ransomware.
High concern: Created or modified a system service, which can keep code running.
High concern: Changed an auto-start location that can make code run after sign-in or restart.
High concern: Attempted to impair or bypass security controls.
Moderate concern: Contained obfuscated or packed code that makes inspection harder.
These are observed capabilities from an isolated analysis. A technique does not prove malicious intent on its own, and the file never ran on your device.
Threat context
How downloaders work
This file is a delivery vehicle. On its own it can look small and harmless, but its job is to quietly pull down and install the REAL payload — often a stealer, ransomware, or bot — from a server the attacker controls.
Bottom line:Because the dangerous part arrives later, early scans can look cleaner than the threat really is.
Attack story
Runtime observations grouped by analysis stage. Arrows organize the stages; they do not claim chronology or causality.
Input file
The submitted object
- FileObserved
&Bill of Lading (BL).vbs
37ffa3580a83f170525c7b422faf529b72968e870c0124b1fbac95a4cc613b36
01Uploaded file
Processes
Runtime execution
- ProcessObserved
Observed process
C:\Windows\syswow64\MsiExec.exe -Embedding A6F7ECBA80BE918C9BF05E4078066861
02Isolated runtime analysis - ProcessObserved
Observed process
"C:\Program Files (x86)\ManageEngine\UEMS_Agent\bin\dcagentregister.exe" -i dc
03Isolated runtime analysis - +1 more recorded observation in Analyst mode
Files
Created or changed
- Written fileObserved
dcagentinstaller.log
C:\Program Files (x86)\ManageEngine\UEMS_Agent\logs\dcagentinstaller.log
04Isolated runtime analysis - Written fileObserved
csr.pem
C:\Program Files (x86)\ManageEngine\UEMS_Agent\Certificates\csr.pem
05Isolated runtime analysis - +1 more recorded observation in Analyst mode
Network
Hosts contacted
- Contacted hostObserved
38.207.189.45
Contact observed during runtime.
06Isolated runtime analysis - Contacted hostObserved
23.195.81.162
Contact observed during runtime.
07Isolated runtime analysis - +1 more recorded observation in Analyst mode
7 recorded facts from one runtime window. Every fact remains independently traceable in Analyst mode.
What this file did when executed
This file was detonated in 1 sandbox and its runtime behaviour was observed.
Adversary techniques mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
- 38.207.189.45
- 23.195.81.162
- 138.113.159.190
- 154.89.157.40
- 8.8.8.8
- 138.113.241.53
- http://subca.ocsp-certum.com/MFIwUDBOMEwwSjAJBgUrDgMCGgUABBTYOkzrrCGQj08njZXbUQQpkoUmuQQUCHbNywf%2FJPbFze27kLzihDdGdfcCEQCy3Ew0ky1wnNS%2FCwmUAWlc
- http://crl.litessl.com/TrustAsiaTLSRSARootCA.crl
- http://crl.litessl.com/LiteSSLRSACA2025-Part2.crl
- https://bgedea.cc/popkkl/oplkll.png
- https://bgedea.cc/mkalq/99ppoi.zip
- https://154.89.157.40:8383/ClientCSRSigningServlet
- ManageEngine UEMS - Agent
- ManageEngine UEMS - Remote Control
- C:\Program Files (x86)\ManageEngine\UEMS_Agent\logs\dcagentinstaller.log
- C:\Program Files (x86)\ManageEngine\UEMS_Agent\Certificates\csr.pem
- C:\Program Files (x86)\ManageEngine\UEMS_Agent\Certificates\key.pem
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\Certificates\client.p12_8524_3240
- C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\LocalLow\Microsoft\CryptnetUrlCache\MetaData\77EC63BDA74BD0D0E0426DC8F8008506
- C:\Windows\SysWOW64\MsiWerCrashmetadata-41
- C:\Program Files (x86)\ManageEngine\UEMS_Agent\Certificates\client.p12
- C:\Program Files (x86)\ManageEngine\UEMS_Agent\Certificates\csr.pem
- C:\Program Files (x86)\ManageEngine\UEMS_Agent\Certificates\key.pem
- C:\Program Files (x86)\ManageEngine\UEMS_Agent\Certificates\client.pem
- dcResourceId_Mutex
- dcCertCreationStatusMutex
- Global\OneSettingQueryMutex+compat+encapsulation
Files this sample writes at runtime
This file drops 10 children at runtime. None are currently flagged malicious in our cache.
- 0379b576d02c884172c9…0f5e72Never scannednever seen before
- 8587742fa147f2886383…3ef019Never scannednever seen before
- 7627f75435af64ab7299…b76aadNever scannednever seen before
- 02d67bceef6d8a887bff…f1b974Never scannednever seen before
- 73bdaa1accf90ae89a86…03e767Never scannednever seen before
- 86dbea70ab491553aee7…efb670Never scannednever seen before
- b614ddc68687aff6cea4…10cb3cNever scannednever seen before
- 9e312e94161158f487b2…b7a57eNever scannednever seen before
- 27800f916566d2a564e4…669f01Never scannednever seen before
- cf33159aaa9aca735bc1…55b19eNever scannednever seen before
Detection & Forensics
Consensus, attribution, signatures, code structure, prevalence, and identity.
Evidence integrity
Chain of custody for the facts preserved in this report.
- 4rule hits recorded
- 9 / 74engines flagged
- 1sources in submission history
Why these facts are shown
Each statement identifies whether it was directly recorded or derived from saved scan facts.
- 01
1 high-confidence signature or behavior rule matched this file.
Verdict inputView chapterProvenanceDerivedSourceSignature and behavior rulesObserved at - 02
9 of 74 antivirus engines flagged the file, including Avast and AVG.
Verdict inputView chapterProvenanceObservedSourceAntivirus analysisObserved at - 03
The hash has been submitted 1 time from 1 source.
ProvenanceDerivedSourceSaved report factsObserved at - 04
Scanned file: &Bill of Lading (BL).vbs — 37ffa3580a83f170525c7b422faf529b72968e870c0124b1fbac95a4cc613b36
ProvenanceObservedSourceUploaded fileObserved at - 05
Observed process — C:\Windows\syswow64\MsiExec.exe -Embedding A6F7ECBA80BE918C9BF05E4078066861
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 06
Observed process — "C:\Program Files (x86)\ManageEngine\UEMS_Agent\bin\dcagentregister.exe" -i dc
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 07
File written: dcagentinstaller.log — C:\Program Files (x86)\ManageEngine\UEMS_Agent\logs\dcagentinstaller.log
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 08
File written: csr.pem — C:\Program Files (x86)\ManageEngine\UEMS_Agent\Certificates\csr.pem
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 09
Contacted host: 38.207.189.45 — Contact observed during runtime.
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 10
Contacted host: 23.195.81.162 — Contact observed during runtime.
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at
Detection sources at a glance
Category: downloader
MalwareBazaar, YARAify, and CIRCL hashlookup completed and returned no entries for this hash.
Signatures and behavior heuristics
A community signature or high-severity behavioral heuristic matched. Signatures identify known patterns; heuristics are strong leads but are not proof on their own.
Sandbox flagged persistence indicators (registry Run keys / services / scheduled tasks).
EvidenceManageEngine UEMS - Agent · ManageEngine UEMS - Remote ControlMITRE T1055 (Process Injection) observed — CreateRemoteThread / APC / reflective-DLL injection. The payload is being smuggled into a legitimate process to bypass AV hooks.
EvidenceC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -pSandbox observed process activity targeting LSASS (Windows credential store). Legitimate software has no business reading LSASS memory — this is Mimikatz-shape behaviour.
EvidenceC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeThe sample contacted an external IP address directly and no application domain was recorded. Direct-IP traffic also occurs in legitimate installers and infrastructure, so this is supporting context only and requires corroboration from host reputation and other runtime evidence.
Evidence38.207.189.45 · 23.195.81.162 · 138.113.159.190
9 of 74 engines flagged this file
View all 74 engine results
PE structure
Not applicablePE structure analysis applies to Windows executable formats, not this file type.
How widely this file has been seen
Barely seen in the wild and first surfaced recently. 9 antivirus detections make that low prevalence materially relevant, but rarity alone is not proof of malware.
Fingerprint and provenance
- File name
- &Bill of Lading (BL).vbs
- Format
- VBA
- Code signing
- Not applicable to this file type
- Size
- 4.5 KB
- Last analyzed
- Jul 13, 2026, 8:12 AM UTC
37ffa3580a83f170525c7b422faf529b72968e870c0124b1fbac95a4cc613b36Safety & FAQ
Complete recovery guidance and answers for the next decision.
What to do now
This file is dangerous. Treat it as harmful and remove it.
- Recovery step 01
Don't run this file. Delete this file from the device, then empty the Recycle Bin or Trash.
- Recovery step 02
If you already ran it, disconnect from the internet and start with a full antivirus scan or Microsoft Defender Offline scan. If compromise is suspected or the problem persists, use a reputable second-opinion scanner and follow incident-recovery or clean-reinstall guidance.
- Recovery step 03
If any of your files were locked or renamed, do NOT pay the ransom — payment rarely restores files. Recover them from a backup instead.
- Recovery step 04
Get a fresh copy from the developer's official site or an official app store.
Safety FAQ
Direct answers grounded in the saved verdict and evidence in this report.
Is &Bill of Lading (BL).vbs malware?
What is &Bill of Lading (BL).vbs?
How many antivirus engines detected &Bill of Lading (BL).vbs?
I already downloaded and ran &Bill of Lading (BL).vbs — what should I do?
How do I remove &Bill of Lading (BL).vbs?
What kind of malware is &Bill of Lading (BL).vbs?
What is the SHA-256 hash of &Bill of Lading (BL).vbs?
How up to date is this analysis of &Bill of Lading (BL).vbs?
Community
Member reviews and reports for this exact file hash.