Is BLOODTRAILVRSCREENMODE-BETA7.zip safe?
No antivirus engine detected malware, but process-injection, impairment, PowerShell bypass, and unresolved direct-IP activity warrant caution before running this archive.
All 75 antivirus engines avoided flagging the archive, and the completed sandbox did not issue a malware finding. However, execution involved PowerShell with an execution-policy bypass, DLL loading through rundll32, and techniques mapped to process injection and defense impairment, while the contacted IP was not reputation-checked.
3bc393583427215e23…bce47b0bab631eRecommended next actions
Before opening or extracting
Do not open or extract it until the source can be verified independently.
If you already opened or extracted it
Stop using it, scan the device, and watch for unexpected behavior or security alerts. Get a fresh copy from the original trusted source and verify its exact hash when possible.
Intelligence
The saved assessment, checked against the scan evidence and recorded coverage.
The reasoning behind this verdict
This section explains the evidence supporting the verdict and keeps conflicting or missing signals visible.
All 75 antivirus engines avoided flagging the archive, and the completed sandbox did not issue a malware finding. However, execution involved PowerShell with an execution-policy bypass, DLL loading through rundll32, and techniques mapped to process injection and defense impairment, while the contacted IP was not reputation-checked.
The strongest reassuring evidence is that 0 of 75 engines flagged the archive, including all 17 reporting tier-1 engines. One completed sandbox run did not issue a malware verdict, and none of the 10 inspected child files was identified as malicious. Nevertheless, runtime evidence mapped activity to T1055, T1485, and T1562.001, while PowerShell used an execution-policy bypass and rundll32 loaded DLLs from a temporary directory. Those actions may fit a game modification utility, but the available evidence does not establish that context or intent. The contacted IP has no complete reputation result, and all 10 child verdicts remain unknown, leaving meaningful uncertainty.
What We Detected
The archive received 0 detections from 75 antivirus engines, including no detections from 17 reporting tier-1 engines. The completed sandbox run did not issue a malware finding, and external intelligence returned no MalwareBazaar, CIRCL, or YARAify match.
Threat Behavior
Execution used PowerShell with an execution-policy bypass and rundll32 to load DLLs from a temporary directory. The observed activity mapped to T1055, T1485, and T1562.001, which can indicate process injection, destructive impact, or defense impairment, although these mappings alone do not prove hostile intent. One external IP, 162.159.36.2, was contacted, but no complete host-reputation result is available. Ten dropped files were inspected without a malicious finding, though their individual verdicts remain unknown.
What To Do Now
Only run the archive if it came from the project's official release channel and its hash matches a publisher-provided value. Keep endpoint protection enabled, and prefer an isolated test environment because the runtime actions are unusually intrusive.
Where this verdict could be wrong3 caveats
- The complete 0/75 engine result, including 17 tier-1 engines, weighs against the behavioral concerns.
- The only completed sandbox run returned a clean verdict and behaviour.hasMaliciousSandboxVerdict=false.
- The contacted IP 162.159.36.2 lacks a completed contactedHosts reputation result, so the direct-IP heuristic remains unresolved.
These are the assessment's weak points. If you believe one applies to your file, report the verdict and we'll re-review it.
- 0/75 antivirus engines reported a detection.
- All 17 reporting tier-1 engines were undetected.
- behaviour.hasMaliciousSandboxVerdict=false across one completed sandbox.
- droppedChildren.hasMaliciousChild=false after 10 inspections.
- No MalwareBazaar, CIRCL, or YARAify hit was present.
- Runtime mapping includes T1055 process injection.
- Runtime mapping includes T1562.001 defense impairment.
- Runtime mapping includes T1485 data destruction.
- PowerShell launched with an execution-policy bypass.
- rundll32 loaded DLLs from a temporary extraction directory.
- Contacted IP 162.159.36.2 lacks a completed reputation check.
Verify the archive against the project's official release source and hash before use. Keep endpoint protection enabled and test it in an isolated environment if verification is unavailable.
Coverage & freshness
Complete means the check returned a usable result. It does not mean the file is safe.
Antivirus
Complete0 of 75 engines flagged the file.
Sandbox
Complete1 isolated runtime environment contributed observations.
Network
Partial1 runtime contact was observed without a completed reputation cross-check.
YARA
Complete2 signature or behavior rules matched.
External intel
Complete3 of 3 independent reference sources completed.
Behavior
Plain-English impact first, then the observed runtime evidence.
Runtime flight recorder
Capture complete- 1isolated sandbox run
- 18MITRE ATT&CK techniques
- 15spawned processes
- 1network contacts
- 34filesystem & mutex artifacts
What this file does
Observed actions and their security significance
High concern: Injected code into another process, a technique that can conceal execution.
High concern: Used an input-capture technique that can record credentials or keystrokes.
High concern: Attempted to impair or bypass security controls.
High concern: Manipulated how the operating system loads code, which can redirect execution.
Moderate concern: Contained obfuscated or packed code that makes inspection harder.
Moderate concern: Runs hidden system commands (script or shell).
Moderate concern: Communicated over a common application protocol; malware can use this for command-and-control.
These are observed capabilities from an isolated analysis. A technique does not prove malicious intent on its own, and the file never ran on your device.
Attack story
Runtime observations grouped by analysis stage. Arrows organize the stages; they do not claim chronology or causality.
Input file
The submitted object
- FileObserved
BLOODTRAILVRSCREENMODE-BETA7.zip
3bc393583427215e2324b63f3391d3237dbe432b6d6dda9f83bce47b0bab631e
01Uploaded file
Processes
Runtime execution
- ProcessObserved
Observed process
"C:\Windows\sysnative\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy bypass -File "C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\BloodTrailScreenMode/Install.ps1"
02Isolated runtime analysis - ProcessObserved
Observed process
"C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe" "C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\BloodTrailScreenMode/payload/dwmapi.dll",#1
03Isolated runtime analysis - +1 more recorded observation in Analyst mode
Files
Created or changed
- Written fileObserved
Windows PowerShell.lnk
C:\Users\<USER>\Desktop\%AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Windows PowerShell\Windows PowerShell.lnk
04Isolated runtime analysis - Written fileObserved
FVK9YC2J2K2Y4Q5CDXQD.temp
C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations\FVK9YC2J2K2Y4Q5CDXQD.temp
05Isolated runtime analysis - +1 more recorded observation in Analyst mode
Network
Hosts contacted
- Contacted hostObserved
162.159.36.2
Contact observed during runtime.
06Isolated runtime analysis
6 recorded facts from one runtime window. Every fact remains independently traceable in Analyst mode.
What this file did when executed
This file was detonated in 1 sandbox and its runtime behaviour was observed.
Adversary techniques mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
- 162.159.36.2
- HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\SessionInfo\1\ApplicationViewManagement\W32:0000000000030052\VirtualDesktop
- HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\SessionInfo\1\ApplicationViewManagement\W32:00000000000101DE\VirtualDesktop
- HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\SessionInfo\1\ApplicationViewManagement\W32:00000000000201EC\VirtualDesktop
- HKEY_CURRENT_USER\SOFTWARE\Microsoft\Windows\CurrentVersion\Explorer\SessionInfo\1\ApplicationViewManagement\W32:000000000005016A\VirtualDesktop
- C:\Users\<USER>\Desktop\%AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Windows PowerShell\Windows PowerShell.lnk
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations\FVK9YC2J2K2Y4Q5CDXQD.temp
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations\590aee7bdd69b59b.customDestinations-ms
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations\590aee7bdd69b59b.customDestinations-ms~RFe03e.TMP
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\PowerShell\StartupProfileData-NonInteractive
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations\590aee7bdd69b59b.customDestinations-ms~RFe03e.TMP
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Packages\Microsoft.XboxGamingOverlay_8wekyb3d8bbwe\LocalCache\KnownGameList.bin
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\GameDVR\KnownGameList.update
- C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WEREC82.tmp
- C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Windows\WER\Temp\WERF8B8.tmp
- Local\WERReportingForProcess3552
- Global\41791e09-4217-42dd-86be-4ba29bd8ec8d
- Local\WERReportingForProcess4584
- Global\bb4f41fc-d858-4713-93ec-91a860f55b14
Files this sample writes at runtime
This file drops 10 children at runtime. None are currently flagged malicious in our cache.
- 061402327a96aadb0bfb…109c41Never scannednever seen before
- fea820d5863ad811abe4…bf1effNever scannednever seen before
- 03c9d35f6a5566683956…27c71fNever scannednever seen before
- fa53eb698e701a7ea418…d18751Never scannednever seen before
- 96ad1146eb96877eab59…87dcf7Never scannednever seen before
- 59e703f5252daaa575db…cd6341Never scannednever seen before
- c0dc0c2a852d986cd736…228aecNever scannednever seen before
- 637434cd0cd0d57c83eb…b971f1Never scannednever seen before
- 9c1480a055cfe394e274…cf1112Never scannednever seen before
- 0255396cbcddf9f45be6…d0b2c0Never scannednever seen before
Detection & Forensics
Consensus, attribution, signatures, code structure, prevalence, and identity.
Evidence integrity
Chain of custody for the facts preserved in this report.
- 2rule hits recorded
- 0 / 75engines flagged
- 5sources in submission history
Why these facts are shown
Each statement identifies whether it was directly recorded or derived from saved scan facts.
- 01
1 high-confidence signature or behavior rule matched this file.
Verdict inputView chapterProvenanceDerivedSourceSignature and behavior rulesObserved at - 02
0 of 75 antivirus engines flagged the file.
ProvenanceObservedSourceAntivirus analysisObserved at - 03
The hash has been submitted 5 times from 5 sources.
ProvenanceDerivedSourceSaved report factsObserved at - 04
Scanned file: BLOODTRAILVRSCREENMODE-BETA7.zip — 3bc393583427215e2324b63f3391d3237dbe432b6d6dda9f83bce47b0bab631e
ProvenanceObservedSourceUploaded fileObserved at - 05
Observed process — "C:\Windows\sysnative\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy bypass -File "C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\BloodTrailScreenMode/Install.ps1"
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 06
Observed process — "C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe" "C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\BloodTrailScreenMode/payload/dwmapi.dll",#1
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 07
File written: Windows PowerShell.lnk — C:\Users\<USER>\Desktop\%AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Windows PowerShell\Windows PowerShell.lnk
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 08
File written: FVK9YC2J2K2Y4Q5CDXQD.temp — C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations\FVK9YC2J2K2Y4Q5CDXQD.temp
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 09
Contacted host: 162.159.36.2 — Contact observed during runtime.
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at
Detection sources at a glance
The available sources did not agree on a named threat category.
MalwareBazaar, YARAify, and CIRCL hashlookup completed and returned no entries for this hash.
Signatures and behavior heuristics
A community signature or high-severity behavioral heuristic matched. Signatures identify known patterns; heuristics are strong leads but are not proof on their own.
The saved runtime evidence maps this activity to MITRE T1055 (Process Injection). The mapping supports possible process injection, but it does not prove the exact injection method or the operator's intent.
Evidence"C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe" "C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\BloodTrailScreenMode/payload/dwmapi.dll",#1The sample contacted an external IP address directly and no application domain was recorded. Direct-IP traffic also occurs in legitimate installers and infrastructure, so this is supporting context only and requires corroboration from host reputation and other runtime evidence.
Evidence162.159.36.2
0 of 75 engines flagged this file
View all 75 engine results
PE structure
Not applicablePE structure analysis applies to Windows executable formats, not this file type.
How widely this file has been seen
Moderate prevalence — neither rare nor common. No strong prior applies.
Fingerprint and provenance
- File name
- BLOODTRAILVRSCREENMODE-BETA7.zip
- Format
- ZIP
- Code signing
- Not applicable to this file type
- Size
- 17.4 MB
- Last analyzed
- Oct 3, 2026, 8:22 PM UTC
3bc393583427215e2324b63f3391d3237dbe432b6d6dda9f83bce47b0bab631eSafety & FAQ
Complete recovery guidance and answers for the next decision.
What to do now
We couldn't fully clear this file. Treat it with caution.
- Recovery step 01
Don't open or extract it unless you're certain it came from a source you trust.
- Recovery step 02
Check where you got it — an unexpected attachment or a random download link is a red flag.
- Recovery step 03
If its origin cannot be confirmed, delete this archive and use a fresh copy from a trusted source. Get a fresh copy from the original trusted source and verify its exact hash when possible.
- Recovery step 04
If you're still unsure, scan it again in a day or two — detections often catch up on newer files.
Safety FAQ
Direct answers grounded in the saved verdict and evidence in this report.
Is BLOODTRAILVRSCREENMODE-BETA7.zip safe, or is it malware?
What is BLOODTRAILVRSCREENMODE-BETA7.zip?
How many antivirus engines detected BLOODTRAILVRSCREENMODE-BETA7.zip?
What should I do if I already opened or extracted BLOODTRAILVRSCREENMODE-BETA7.zip?
How do I remove BLOODTRAILVRSCREENMODE-BETA7.zip?
What is the SHA-256 hash of BLOODTRAILVRSCREENMODE-BETA7.zip?
How up to date is this analysis of BLOODTRAILVRSCREENMODE-BETA7.zip?
Community
Member reviews and reports for this exact file hash.