Is Loader[1].rar safe?
Thirty-one of 75 engines flagged this archive, while tier-1 detections naming Shelma and observed process-injection and defense-impairment techniques indicate a backdoor payload.
The archive drew detections from 31 of 75 engines, including eight high-trust engines. Kaspersky and TrendMicro-HouseCall identify Shelma, while runtime evidence maps activity to process injection and defense impairment; quarantine the archive and do not extract or run it.
6e0b51b82ab691e0a9…9525509a321aa5Recommended next actions
Before opening or extracting
Do not open or extract it. Delete this archive from the device, then empty the Recycle Bin or Trash.
If you already opened or extracted it
Close it. If it opened links, requested credentials, or triggered unexpected behavior, disconnect from the internet and run a full device scan.
Intelligence
The saved assessment, checked against the scan evidence and recorded coverage.
The reasoning behind this verdict
This section explains the evidence supporting the verdict and keeps conflicting or missing signals visible.
The archive drew detections from 31 of 75 engines, including eight high-trust engines. Kaspersky and TrendMicro-HouseCall identify Shelma, while runtime evidence maps activity to process injection and defense impairment; quarantine the archive and do not extract or run it.
The detection volume is substantial: 31 of 75 engines flagged the archive, including eight high-trust engines. Kaspersky and TrendMicro-HouseCall both name Shelma, while several other high-trust products identify a trojan, packed .NET payload, or crypted MSIL program. One completed sandbox run recorded T1055 process injection and T1562.001 defense impairment, both offensive techniques consistent with the detections. The file is newly observed and has no established benign distribution history. No complete contacted-host reputation result is available, and the two dropped children remain unclassified, so those areas provide no reassurance. The combined engine and runtime evidence strongly supports a Shelma-family backdoor assessment.
What We Detected
31 of 75 antivirus engines flagged the RAR archive, including eight high-trust engines. Kaspersky reported HEUR:Backdoor.MSIL.Shelma.gen, and TrendMicro-HouseCall reported Trojan.MSIL.SHELMA.USBLHU26. Other high-trust engines identified generic trojan, packed .NET, or crypted MSIL traits, supporting the presence of a concealed executable payload.
Threat Behavior
A completed sandbox run recorded T1055 (Process Injection) and T1562.001 (Impair Defenses). These techniques can let a payload execute inside another process and interfere with security controls. The archive launched a temporary loader executable, but no complete host-reputation cross-check is available because contacted-host analysis was not saved. Two dropped files were inspected, but both remain unclassified rather than confirmed benign.
What To Do Now
Do not extract or execute the archive. Keep endpoint protection enabled, quarantine or delete the file, and run a full system scan if it was opened. If the loader executed, isolate the device from sensitive networks and review running processes, security-control changes, and recently created files.
Where this verdict could be wrong4 caveats
- engines.tier1FamilyConsensus.strong=false because only 2 tier-1 engines agree specifically on Shelma.
- behaviour.hasMaliciousSandboxVerdict=false, although the completed run recorded T1055 and T1562.001.
- externalIntel.yaraify.ruleCount=0, externalIntel.circl.hit=false, and externalIntel.malwareBazaar.hit=false; these absences may reflect intelligence-coverage gaps for a newly observed sample.
- droppedChildren.hasMaliciousChild=false, but the two child verdicts are unknown rather than established benign results.
These are the assessment's weak points. If you believe one applies to your file, report the verdict and we'll re-review it.
- behaviour.hasMaliciousSandboxVerdict=false
- droppedChildren.hasMaliciousChild=false
- externalIntel.yaraify.ruleCount=0
- externalIntel.malwareBazaar.hit=false
- 31/75 antivirus-engine detections
- Eight high-trust engines flagged the archive
- Kaspersky and TrendMicro-HouseCall identify Shelma
- T1055 process-injection activity
- T1562.001 defense-impairment activity
- Newly observed file with only one submission
Quarantine or delete the archive without extracting it, and keep endpoint protection enabled. If it was executed, isolate the system and perform a full security scan and incident review.
Coverage & freshness
Complete means the check returned a usable result. It does not mean the file is safe.
Antivirus
Complete31 of 75 engines flagged the file.
Sandbox
Complete1 isolated runtime environment contributed observations.
Network
Not runNo contacted-host reputation check is recorded.
No timestamp recordedYARA
Complete1 signature or behavior rule matched.
External intel
Complete3 of 3 independent reference sources completed.
Behavior
Plain-English impact first, then the observed runtime evidence.
Runtime flight recorder
Capture complete- 1isolated sandbox run
- 11MITRE ATT&CK techniques
- 1spawned processes
- 0network contacts
- 1filesystem & mutex artifacts
What this file does
Observed actions and their security significance
High concern: Injected code into another process, a technique that can conceal execution.
High concern: Attempted to impair or bypass security controls.
High concern: Manipulated how the operating system loads code, which can redirect execution.
Moderate concern: Runs hidden system commands (script or shell).
Moderate concern: Communicated over a common application protocol; malware can use this for command-and-control.
Moderate concern: Checks which security software you have installed.
Note: Reads your Windows user-account details.
These are observed capabilities from an isolated analysis. A technique does not prove malicious intent on its own, and the file never ran on your device.
Threat context
How remote-access malware works
This opens a secret 'back door' into your computer. Once it's running, an attacker can control your PC from anywhere — see your screen, read your files, switch on your webcam, install more malware, or use your machine to attack others.
Bottom line:It's built to stay hidden and keep that connection open for as long as possible.
Attack story
Runtime observations grouped by analysis stage. Arrows organize the stages; they do not claim chronology or causality.
Input file
The submitted object
- FileObserved
Loader[1].rar
6e0b51b82ab691e0a96d14303093f6f36dc74ef7c435de7de69525509a321aa5
01Uploaded file
Processes
Runtime execution
- ProcessObserved
Observed process
"C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\loader.exe"
02Isolated runtime analysis
Files
Created or changed
- Written fileObserved
loader.exe.log
C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\loader.exe.log
03Isolated runtime analysis - Dropped fileDerived
b9567d54fea33c2bb7d445a4f92561dfc2f22c1c3753993936282dae865bd0c5
No child-file verdict was available.
04Dropped-file analysis - +1 more recorded observation in Analyst mode
4 recorded facts from one runtime window. Every fact remains independently traceable in Analyst mode.
What this file did when executed
This file was detonated in 1 sandbox and its runtime behaviour was observed.
Adversary techniques mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\loader.exe.log
Files this sample writes at runtime
This file drops 2 children at runtime. None are currently flagged malicious in our cache.
- b9567d54fea33c2bb7d4…5bd0c5Never scannednever seen before
- 978228083a455adcd340…c3168dNever scannednever seen before
Detection & Forensics
Consensus, attribution, signatures, code structure, prevalence, and identity.
Evidence integrity
Chain of custody for the facts preserved in this report.
- 1rule hit recorded
- 31 / 75engines flagged
- 1sources in submission history
Why these facts are shown
Each statement identifies whether it was directly recorded or derived from saved scan facts.
- 01
1 high-confidence signature or behavior rule matched this file.
Verdict inputView chapterProvenanceDerivedSourceSignature and behavior rulesObserved at - 02
31 of 75 antivirus engines flagged the file, including AhnLab-V3 and ALYac.
Verdict inputView chapterProvenanceObservedSourceAntivirus analysisObserved at - 03
The hash has been submitted 1 time from 1 source.
ProvenanceDerivedSourceSaved report factsObserved at - 04
Scanned file: Loader[1].rar — 6e0b51b82ab691e0a96d14303093f6f36dc74ef7c435de7de69525509a321aa5
ProvenanceObservedSourceUploaded fileObserved at - 05
Observed process — "C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\loader.exe"
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 06
File written: loader.exe.log — C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\CLR_v4.0\UsageLogs\loader.exe.log
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 07
Dropped file: b9567d54fea33c2bb7d445a4f92561dfc2f22c1c3753993936282dae865bd0c5 — No child-file verdict was available.
ProvenanceDerivedSourceDropped-file analysisObserved at
Detection sources at a glance
Category: backdoor
MalwareBazaar, YARAify, and CIRCL hashlookup completed and returned no entries for this hash.
Signatures and behavior heuristics
A community signature or high-severity behavioral heuristic matched. Signatures identify known patterns; heuristics are strong leads but are not proof on their own.
The saved runtime evidence maps this activity to MITRE T1055 (Process Injection). The mapping supports possible process injection, but it does not prove the exact injection method or the operator's intent.
Evidence"C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\loader.exe"
31 of 75 engines flagged this file
View all 75 engine results
PE structure
Not applicablePE structure analysis applies to Windows executable formats, not this file type.
How widely this file has been seen
Barely seen in the wild and first surfaced recently. 31 antivirus detections make that low prevalence materially relevant, but rarity alone is not proof of malware.
Fingerprint and provenance
- File name
- Loader[1].rar
- Format
- RAR
- Code signing
- Not applicable to this file type
- Size
- 12.9 MB
- Last analyzed
- Sep 23, 2026, 10:03 PM UTC
6e0b51b82ab691e0a96d14303093f6f36dc74ef7c435de7de69525509a321aa5Safety & FAQ
Complete recovery guidance and answers for the next decision.
What to do now
This file is dangerous. Treat it as harmful and remove it.
- Recovery step 01
Don't open or extract this archive. Delete this archive from the device, then empty the Recycle Bin or Trash.
- Recovery step 02
If you already opened or extracted it, disconnect from the internet and start with a full antivirus scan or Microsoft Defender Offline scan. If compromise is suspected or the problem persists, use a reputable second-opinion scanner and follow incident-recovery or clean-reinstall guidance.
- Recovery step 03
If you typed any passwords while it was open, change them from a device you trust.
- Recovery step 04
Get a fresh copy from the original trusted source and verify its exact hash when possible.
Safety FAQ
Direct answers grounded in the saved verdict and evidence in this report.
Is Loader[1].rar a virus?
What is Loader[1].rar?
How many antivirus engines detected Loader[1].rar?
What should I do if I already opened or extracted Loader[1].rar?
How do I remove Loader[1].rar?
What kind of malware is Loader[1].rar?
What is the SHA-256 hash of Loader[1].rar?
How up to date is this analysis of Loader[1].rar?
Community
Member reviews and reports for this exact file hash.