Is VeloStrap V0.2.1.zip safe?
ZIP archive containing a PE that triggered three offensive MITRE techniques and direct-IP contacts, yet only one low-trust engine flagged it.
One low-trust engine (Bkav) flagged the sample; 16 tier-1 engines remained silent. Sandbox recorded process-injection, credential-store access and direct-IP traffic, but no tier-1 consensus or malicious child files were found.
94b2901a1a4edfc022…8eb279ec3de550Recommended next actions
Before opening or extracting
Do not open or extract it until the source can be verified independently.
If you already opened or extracted it
Stop using it, scan the device, and watch for unexpected behavior or security alerts. Get a fresh copy from the original trusted source and verify its exact hash when possible.
Intelligence
The saved assessment, checked against the scan evidence and recorded coverage.
The reasoning behind this verdict
This section explains the evidence supporting the verdict and keeps conflicting or missing signals visible.
One low-trust engine (Bkav) flagged the sample; 16 tier-1 engines remained silent. Sandbox recorded process-injection, credential-store access and direct-IP traffic, but no tier-1 consensus or malicious child files were found.
The single low-trust detection is outweighed by the absence of tier-1 flags, yet the sandbox behaviour (T1055, T1486, T1562.001 plus direct-no complete contacted-host reputation result was available portable software. Medium prevalence and lack of external-intel corroboration leave the file in mixed-signal territory. No complete host-reputation cross-check is available, so contacted-IP risk cannot be fully assessed.
What We Detected
75 engines scanned the ZIP; only Bkav returned a malicious label. Sandbox execution showed process injection (T1055), defense impairment (T1562.001) and data-encryption activity (T1486), plus direct-IP connections to two external addresses.
Threat Behavior
The observed MITRE techniques and direct-IP traffic raise concern, but no tier-1 engine corroborated malice and no dropped child files were flagged malicious. Coverage of contacted-host reputation is incomplete.
What To Do Now
Do not execute the contained executable without additional verification. Keep endpoint protection enabled and consider re-scanning after more engines or sandbox runs complete.
Where this verdict could be wrong2 caveats
- engines.tier1Malicious=0 and onlyLowTrustFlagging=true — single low-trust detection often false positive.
- hasMaliciousSandboxVerdict=false and droppedChildren.hasMaliciousChild=false — no sandbox or child confirmation of malice.
These are the assessment's weak points. If you believe one applies to your file, report the verdict and we'll re-review it.
- Zero tier-1 malicious detections
- No malicious dropped children
- Medium prevalence over 34 days
- Sandbox observed T1055, T1486, T1562.001
- Direct-IP contacts without domain names
- Single low-trust detection may be heuristic noise
Treat as suspicious pending further sandbox or reputation data; keep all security software active.
Coverage & freshness
Complete means the check returned a usable result. It does not mean the file is safe.
Antivirus
Complete1 of 75 engines flagged the file.
Sandbox
Complete1 isolated runtime environment contributed observations.
Network
Partial2 runtime contacts were observed without a completed reputation cross-check.
YARA
Complete3 signature or behavior rules matched.
External intel
Complete3 of 3 independent reference sources completed.
Behavior
Plain-English impact first, then the observed runtime evidence.
Runtime flight recorder
Capture complete- 1isolated sandbox run
- 11MITRE ATT&CK techniques
- 13spawned processes
- 2network contacts
- 16filesystem & mutex artifacts
What this file does
Observed actions and their security significance
High concern: Injected code into another process, a technique that can conceal execution.
High concern: Encrypted files or data, behaviour commonly associated with ransomware.
High concern: Attempted to impair or bypass security controls.
High concern: Manipulated how the operating system loads code, which can redirect execution.
Moderate concern: Communicated over a common application protocol; malware can use this for command-and-control.
Moderate concern: Scans through your files and folders.
Moderate concern: Checked the environment for virtualisation or analysis tools.
These are observed capabilities from an isolated analysis. A technique does not prove malicious intent on its own, and the file never ran on your device.
Attack story
Runtime observations grouped by analysis stage. Arrows organize the stages; they do not claim chronology or causality.
Input file
The submitted object
- FileObserved
VeloStrap V0.2.1.zip
94b2901a1a4edfc022dceff1a1d6166a8cd6f0efc861a7d3b08eb279ec3de550
01Uploaded file
Processes
Runtime execution
- ProcessObserved
Observed process
"C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\VeloStrap.exe"
02Isolated runtime analysis - ProcessObserved
Observed process
C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "ver"
03Isolated runtime analysis - +1 more recorded observation in Analyst mode
Files
Created or changed
- Written fileObserved
_avif.cp314-win_amd64.pyd
C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\_MEI53282\PIL\_avif.cp314-win_amd64.pyd
04Isolated runtime analysis - Written fileObserved
_imaging.cp314-win_amd64.pyd
C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\_MEI53282\PIL\_imaging.cp314-win_amd64.pyd
05Isolated runtime analysis - +1 more recorded observation in Analyst mode
Network
Hosts contacted
- Contacted hostObserved
185.199.110.133
Contact observed during runtime.
06Isolated runtime analysis - Contacted hostObserved
162.159.36.2
Contact observed during runtime.
07Isolated runtime analysis - +1 more recorded observation in Analyst mode
7 recorded facts from one runtime window. Every fact remains independently traceable in Analyst mode.
What this file did when executed
This file was detonated in 1 sandbox and its runtime behaviour was observed.
Adversary techniques mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
- 185.199.110.133
- 162.159.36.2
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\_MEI53282\PIL\_avif.cp314-win_amd64.pyd
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\_MEI53282\PIL\_imaging.cp314-win_amd64.pyd
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\_MEI53282\PIL\_imagingcms.cp314-win_amd64.pyd
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\_MEI53282\PIL\_imagingmath.cp314-win_amd64.pyd
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\_MEI53282\PIL\_imagingtk.cp314-win_amd64.pyd
- Global\OneSettingQueryMutex+compat+encapsulation
Files this sample writes at runtime
This file drops 10 children at runtime. None are currently flagged malicious in our cache.
- 48f4a239c25354f0e9f8…17ecedNever scannednever seen before
- 3271d39d7b4dcd841e8e…efe5e5Never scannednever seen before
- cb71909bf01a3a7a4c73…d46e13Never scannednever seen before
- fd4847b99cd504a66bdc…6dede1Never scannednever seen before
- 6a99bc0128e0c7d6cbbf…cbc6c8Never scannednever seen before
- 98074c85650a420a095a…b084e9Never scannednever seen before
- 30a9f5a26fd341c2b4a8…328af4Never scannednever seen before
- 1f8259cc74aed52e4cd2…52824aNever scannednever seen before
- 81eca6840b87f2def9fc…d7aaaaNever scannednever seen before
- 4f05f31ca026bbfeeee4…7ab5deNever scannednever seen before
Detection & Forensics
Consensus, attribution, signatures, code structure, prevalence, and identity.
Evidence integrity
Chain of custody for the facts preserved in this report.
- 3rule hits recorded
- 1 / 75engines flagged
- 68sources in submission history
Why these facts are shown
Each statement identifies whether it was directly recorded or derived from saved scan facts.
- 01
1 high-confidence signature or behavior rule matched this file.
Verdict inputView chapterProvenanceDerivedSourceSignature and behavior rulesObserved at - 02
1 of 75 antivirus engines flagged the file, including Bkav.
Verdict inputView chapterProvenanceObservedSourceAntivirus analysisObserved at - 03
The hash has been submitted 74 times from 68 sources.
ProvenanceDerivedSourceSaved report factsObserved at - 04
Scanned file: VeloStrap V0.2.1.zip — 94b2901a1a4edfc022dceff1a1d6166a8cd6f0efc861a7d3b08eb279ec3de550
ProvenanceObservedSourceUploaded fileObserved at - 05
Observed process — "C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\VeloStrap.exe"
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 06
Observed process — C:\Windows\system32\cmd.exe /c "ver"
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 07
File written: _avif.cp314-win_amd64.pyd — C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\_MEI53282\PIL\_avif.cp314-win_amd64.pyd
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 08
File written: _imaging.cp314-win_amd64.pyd — C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\_MEI53282\PIL\_imaging.cp314-win_amd64.pyd
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 09
Contacted host: 185.199.110.133 — Contact observed during runtime.
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 10
Contacted host: 162.159.36.2 — Contact observed during runtime.
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at
Detection sources at a glance
The available sources did not agree on a named threat category.
MalwareBazaar, YARAify, and CIRCL hashlookup completed and returned no entries for this hash.
Signatures and behavior heuristics
A community signature or high-severity behavioral heuristic matched. Signatures identify known patterns; heuristics are strong leads but are not proof on their own.
The saved runtime evidence maps this activity to MITRE T1055 (Process Injection). The mapping supports possible process injection, but it does not prove the exact injection method or the operator's intent.
EvidenceC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -pSandbox observed process activity targeting LSASS (Windows credential store). Legitimate software has no business reading LSASS memory — this is Mimikatz-shape behaviour.
EvidenceC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeThe sample contacted an external IP address directly and no application domain was recorded. Direct-IP traffic also occurs in legitimate installers and infrastructure, so this is supporting context only and requires corroboration from host reputation and other runtime evidence.
Evidence185.199.110.133 · 162.159.36.2
1 of 75 engines flagged this file
View all 75 engine results
PE structure
Not applicablePE structure analysis applies to Windows executable formats, not this file type.
How widely this file has been seen
Moderate prevalence — neither rare nor common. No strong prior applies.
Fingerprint and provenance
- File name
- VeloStrap V0.2.1.zip
- Format
- ZIP
- Code signing
- Not applicable to this file type
- Size
- 49.1 MB
- Last analyzed
- Aug 31, 2026, 8:53 AM UTC
94b2901a1a4edfc022dceff1a1d6166a8cd6f0efc861a7d3b08eb279ec3de550Safety & FAQ
Complete recovery guidance and answers for the next decision.
What to do now
We couldn't fully clear this file. Treat it with caution.
- Recovery step 01
Don't open or extract it unless you're certain it came from a source you trust.
- Recovery step 02
Check where you got it — an unexpected attachment or a random download link is a red flag.
- Recovery step 03
If its origin cannot be confirmed, delete this archive and use a fresh copy from a trusted source. Get a fresh copy from the original trusted source and verify its exact hash when possible.
- Recovery step 04
If you're still unsure, scan it again in a day or two — detections often catch up on newer files.
Safety FAQ
Direct answers grounded in the saved verdict and evidence in this report.
Is VeloStrap V0.2.1.zip safe, or is it malware?
What is VeloStrap V0.2.1.zip?
How many antivirus engines detected VeloStrap V0.2.1.zip?
I already downloaded and opened or extracted VeloStrap V0.2.1.zip — what should I do?
How do I remove VeloStrap V0.2.1.zip?
What is the SHA-256 hash of VeloStrap V0.2.1.zip?
How up to date is this analysis of VeloStrap V0.2.1.zip?
Community
Member reviews and reports for this exact file hash.