Is WhatYouNeed - Copy.zip safe?
No engines detected the archive, but one sandbox recorded process-injection, privilege-escalation, defense-evasion, and possible LSASS-targeting activity requiring caution.
All 74 antivirus engines were silent, including 17 tier-1 engines, and no external intelligence source identified a malware family. However, the completed sandbox run mapped activity to process injection, privilege escalation, defense evasion, and possible LSASS access, while one extracted child remains concerning and three lack verdicts.
a54a93b1d406faf9c9…952020fbfa7eb7Recommended next actions
Before opening or extracting
Do not open or extract it until the source can be verified independently.
If you already opened or extracted it
Stop using it, scan the device, and watch for unexpected behavior or security alerts. Get a fresh copy from the original trusted source and verify its exact hash when possible.
Intelligence
The saved assessment, checked against the scan evidence and recorded coverage.
The reasoning behind this verdict
This section explains the evidence supporting the verdict and keeps conflicting or missing signals visible.
All 74 antivirus engines were silent, including 17 tier-1 engines, and no external intelligence source identified a malware family. However, the completed sandbox run mapped activity to process injection, privilege escalation, defense evasion, and possible LSASS access, while one extracted child remains concerning and three lack verdicts.
The archive received no detections from 74 engines, including all 17 reporting tier-1 engines. One completed sandbox run did not issue a malicious summary, but its saved telemetry maps to T1055, T1548, and T1562.001 and includes possible interaction with LSASS. These techniques can occur in injectors or modification tools, yet they are also strongly associated with offensive activity. Of four extracted children, none is confirmed malicious, one is marked suspicious, and three remain unclassified. No external intelligence hit or named malware family corroborates the behavioral concern, so the evidence remains mixed rather than conclusive.
What We Detected
The ZIP archive was not flagged by any of 74 antivirus engines, including 17 tier-1 engines. External intelligence checks also returned no MalwareBazaar, CIRCL, or YARAify match, and no malware family was identified.
Threat Behavior
One completed sandbox run recorded indicators mapped to T1055 process injection, T1548 privilege escalation, and T1562.001 defense impairment. The saved process evidence also references LSASS, which can indicate credential-access activity, although the available telemetry does not prove that memory was successfully read. Four files were extracted: one has a suspicious cached assessment and three have no stored verdict. The run recorded no network contacts, but no separate host-reputation cross-check was completed or saved.
What To Do Now
Do not run the extracted executables on a production system until their hashes and behavior are independently reviewed. Keep endpoint protection enabled, quarantine the archive if its source is untrusted, and test only in an isolated environment without sensitive accounts or credentials.
Where this verdict could be wrong4 caveats
- The single sandbox labeled its run clean, yet the saved runtime mapping includes process injection, privilege escalation, defense evasion, and possible LSASS targeting.
- No antivirus engine detected the archive, which weighs strongly against known malware but does not explain the offensive runtime indicators.
- Three of four dropped children have no stored verdict, leaving incomplete child-file coverage.
- contactedHosts=null means no complete host-reputation result is available, although the observed run recorded no contacted domains, IPs, or URLs.
These are the assessment's weak points. If you believe one applies to your file, report the verdict and we'll re-review it.
- 0/74 antivirus engines reported a detection
- All 17 reporting tier-1 engines were silent
- behaviour.hasMaliciousSandboxVerdict=false
- droppedChildren.hasMaliciousChild=false
- YARAify, CIRCL, and MalwareBazaar returned no hits
- Runtime telemetry mapped to T1055 process injection
- Runtime telemetry mapped to T1548 privilege escalation
- Runtime telemetry mapped to T1562.001 defense impairment
- Saved process evidence references LSASS
- One of four extracted children has a suspicious cached assessment
- Three extracted children have no stored verdict
Quarantine the archive and avoid executing its contents on a normal workstation until the extracted files receive complete analysis. Keep antivirus and endpoint protection enabled throughout any isolated testing.
Coverage & freshness
Complete means the check returned a usable result. It does not mean the file is safe.
Antivirus
Complete0 of 74 engines flagged the file.
Sandbox
Complete1 isolated runtime environment contributed observations.
Network
Not runNo contacted-host reputation check is recorded.
No timestamp recordedYARA
Complete2 signature or behavior rules matched.
External intel
Complete3 of 3 independent reference sources completed.
Behavior
Plain-English impact first, then the observed runtime evidence.
Runtime flight recorder
Capture complete- 1isolated sandbox run
- 10MITRE ATT&CK techniques
- 15spawned processes
- 0network contacts
- 13filesystem & mutex artifacts
What this file does
Observed actions and their security significance
High concern: Injected code into another process, a technique that can conceal execution.
High concern: Attempted to impair or bypass security controls.
High concern: Manipulated how the operating system loads code, which can redirect execution.
Moderate concern: Communicated over a common application protocol; malware can use this for command-and-control.
Moderate concern: Checked the environment for virtualisation or analysis tools.
Note: Reads your Windows user-account details.
Note: Collects details about your system.
These are observed capabilities from an isolated analysis. A technique does not prove malicious intent on its own, and the file never ran on your device.
Attack story
Runtime observations grouped by analysis stage. Arrows organize the stages; they do not claim chronology or causality.
Input file
The submitted object
- FileObserved
WhatYouNeed - Copy.zip
a54a93b1d406faf9c9613a5d894cfeec79ec0d140de3235c16952020fbfa7eb7
01Uploaded file
Processes
Runtime execution
- ProcessObserved
Observed process
"C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\WhatYouNeed/fastflag_injector_gui_enhanced.exe"
02Isolated runtime analysis - ProcessObserved
Observed process
"C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\WhatYouNeed/Velostrap (1).exe"
03Isolated runtime analysis - +1 more recorded observation in Analyst mode
Files
Created or changed
- Dropped fileDerived
6fd8ae68be5e103a957250c32eae71d6a5f6495ac85ffe7d5a278d1474fe154e
Saved child-file verdict: suspicious.
04Dropped-file analysis - Written fileObserved
kmrrp4nk.wd4
C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\kmrrp4nk.wd4
05Isolated runtime analysis - +1 more recorded observation in Analyst mode
5 recorded facts from one runtime window. Every fact remains independently traceable in Analyst mode.
What this file did when executed
This file was detonated in 1 sandbox and its runtime behaviour was observed.
Adversary techniques mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
- HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRU\NodeSlots
- HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRU\MRUListEx
- HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\BagMRU\1\MRUListEx
- HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Software\Classes\Local Settings\Software\Microsoft\Windows\Shell\Bags\3\Shell\SniffedFolderType
- C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\kmrrp4nk.wd4
- C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\kmrrp4nk.wd4\WhatYouNeed
- C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\kmrrp4nk.wd4\WhatYouNeed\FroststrapExport.json
- C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\kmrrp4nk.wd4\WhatYouNeed\Velostrap (1).exe
- C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\kmrrp4nk.wd4\WhatYouNeed\fastflag_injector_gui_enhanced.exe
- Local\Shell.CMruPidlList
- Local\SessionImmersiveColorMutex
- Global\SyncRootManager
- Local\Mutexf01b4d95cf55d32a.automaticDestinations-ms
- Global\OneSettingQueryMutex+compat+encapsulation
Files this sample writes at runtime
This file drops 4 children. 1 is flagged suspicious in our cache.
- dfbbc09b63f105f414ac…6e4987Never scannednever seen before
- 4477969ac1b4a5757371…ac9c02Never scannednever seen before
- 6fd8ae68be5e103a9572…fe154eSuspicious1/75 enginestrust 45from our cache
- 5e2da9c67672fd252c27…cb9913Never scannednever seen before
Detection & Forensics
Consensus, attribution, signatures, code structure, prevalence, and identity.
Evidence integrity
Chain of custody for the facts preserved in this report.
- 2rule hits recorded
- 0 / 74engines flagged
- 5sources in submission history
Why these facts are shown
Each statement identifies whether it was directly recorded or derived from saved scan facts.
- 01
1 high-confidence signature or behavior rule matched this file.
Verdict inputView chapterProvenanceDerivedSourceSignature and behavior rulesObserved at - 02
0 of 74 antivirus engines flagged the file.
ProvenanceObservedSourceAntivirus analysisObserved at - 03
The hash has been submitted 5 times from 5 sources.
ProvenanceDerivedSourceSaved report factsObserved at - 04
Scanned file: WhatYouNeed - Copy.zip — a54a93b1d406faf9c9613a5d894cfeec79ec0d140de3235c16952020fbfa7eb7
ProvenanceObservedSourceUploaded fileObserved at - 05
Observed process — "C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\WhatYouNeed/fastflag_injector_gui_enhanced.exe"
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 06
Observed process — "C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\WhatYouNeed/Velostrap (1).exe"
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 07
Dropped file: 6fd8ae68be5e103a957250c32eae71d6a5f6495ac85ffe7d5a278d1474fe154e — Saved child-file verdict: suspicious.
ProvenanceDerivedSourceDropped-file analysisObserved at - 08
File written: kmrrp4nk.wd4 — C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\kmrrp4nk.wd4
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at
Detection sources at a glance
The available sources did not agree on a named threat category.
MalwareBazaar, YARAify, and CIRCL hashlookup completed and returned no entries for this hash.
Signatures and behavior heuristics
A community signature or high-severity behavioral heuristic matched. Signatures identify known patterns; heuristics are strong leads but are not proof on their own.
The saved runtime evidence maps this activity to MITRE T1055 (Process Injection). The mapping supports possible process injection, but it does not prove the exact injection method or the operator's intent.
EvidenceC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -pSandbox observed process activity targeting LSASS (Windows credential store). Legitimate software has no business reading LSASS memory — this is Mimikatz-shape behaviour.
EvidenceC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe
0 of 74 engines flagged this file
View all 74 engine results
PE structure
Not applicablePE structure analysis applies to Windows executable formats, not this file type.
How widely this file has been seen
Moderate prevalence — neither rare nor common. No strong prior applies.
Fingerprint and provenance
- File name
- WhatYouNeed - Copy.zip
- Format
- ZIP
- Code signing
- Not applicable to this file type
- Size
- 4.9 MB
- Last analyzed
- Oct 1, 2026, 3:42 PM UTC
a54a93b1d406faf9c9613a5d894cfeec79ec0d140de3235c16952020fbfa7eb7Safety & FAQ
Complete recovery guidance and answers for the next decision.
What to do now
We couldn't fully clear this file. Treat it with caution.
- Recovery step 01
Don't open or extract it unless you're certain it came from a source you trust.
- Recovery step 02
Check where you got it — an unexpected attachment or a random download link is a red flag.
- Recovery step 03
If its origin cannot be confirmed, delete this archive and use a fresh copy from a trusted source. Get a fresh copy from the original trusted source and verify its exact hash when possible.
- Recovery step 04
If you're still unsure, scan it again in a day or two — detections often catch up on newer files.
Safety FAQ
Direct answers grounded in the saved verdict and evidence in this report.
Is WhatYouNeed - Copy.zip safe, or is it malware?
What is WhatYouNeed - Copy.zip?
How many antivirus engines detected WhatYouNeed - Copy.zip?
What should I do if I already opened or extracted WhatYouNeed - Copy.zip?
How do I remove WhatYouNeed - Copy.zip?
What is the SHA-256 hash of WhatYouNeed - Copy.zip?
How up to date is this analysis of WhatYouNeed - Copy.zip?
Community
Member reviews and reports for this exact file hash.