Is kisskh.window.app.zip safe?
Only 2 of 75 engines flagged this archive, but observed process-injection and LSASS-targeting indicators warrant caution until its embedded executables are independently verified.
The antivirus pattern strongly resembles a false positive: only Jiangmin and MaxSecure detected it, while no tier-1 engine did. However, the completed runtime record includes process-injection, service, defense-evasion, and LSASS-targeting indicators, so the archive should not be run without further validation.
cbc72ee3e3a337e10d…8bb075cc4a079aRecommended next actions
Before opening or extracting
Do not open or extract it until the source can be verified independently.
If you already opened or extracted it
Stop using it, scan the device, and watch for unexpected behavior or security alerts. Get a fresh copy from the original trusted source and verify its exact hash when possible.
Intelligence
The saved assessment, checked against the scan evidence and recorded coverage.
The reasoning behind this verdict
This section explains the evidence supporting the verdict and keeps conflicting or missing signals visible.
The antivirus pattern strongly resembles a false positive: only Jiangmin and MaxSecure detected it, while no tier-1 engine did. However, the completed runtime record includes process-injection, service, defense-evasion, and LSASS-targeting indicators, so the archive should not be run without further validation.
Only 2 of 75 engines flagged the archive, both from the low-trust tier, and no tier-1 family consensus supports the Khalesi name. A completed sandbox did not issue a malicious verdict, and neither researcher rules nor external repository intelligence corroborated the detections. However, the runtime record maps activity to T1055, T1543.002, and T1562.001 and also records targeting of LSASS, which is materially concerning. The ten dropped files produced no malicious-child finding, but all ten remain unclassified, limiting reassurance. No complete contacted-host reputation result is available, although the saved run lists no network contacts. These mixed signals support containment and additional analysis rather than trusting the weak engine labels or dismissing the behavioral indicators.
What We Detected
Only 2 of 75 antivirus engines flagged the ZIP archive. Jiangmin named Khalesi, while MaxSecure used a generic trojan label; both are low-trust detections, and tier1Malicious=0. No YARAify rules or MalwareBazaar record corroborated those labels.
Threat Behavior
One completed sandbox run did not return a malicious verdict, but its saved telemetry maps activity to process injection (T1055), service execution or persistence (T1543.002), and impairment of defenses (T1562.001). A separate heuristic also records activity targeting LSASS, a credential-sensitive Windows process. Ten dropped files were inspected without a malicious-child finding, but every child remains unclassified. No complete contacted-host reputation cross-check is available; the saved run itself lists no contacted domains, IPs, or URLs.
What To Do Now
Do not execute the archive on a production system. Keep endpoint protection enabled, obtain the package from a verified official source, compare its hash with a publisher-provided value, and inspect the embedded executables in an isolated environment before use.
Where this verdict could be wrong3 caveats
- The runtime evidence maps activity to T1055 and records LSASS targeting, which is unusual and materially more concerning than the low-trust antivirus labels alone.
- The single completed sandbox returned a clean verdict, but one run may not fully exercise delayed or environment-aware behavior.
- All 10 dropped children have unknown verdicts, so hasMaliciousChild=false does not establish that the extracted contents are benign.
These are the assessment's weak points. If you believe one applies to your file, report the verdict and we'll re-review it.
- Only 2/75 engines detected the archive, and both detections are low-trust.
- engines.tier1Malicious=0, with 14 tier-1 engines reporting no detection.
- behaviour.hasMaliciousSandboxVerdict=false.
- externalIntel.yaraify.ruleCount=0 and externalIntel.malwareBazaar.hit=false.
- droppedChildren.hasMaliciousChild=false.
- Runtime evidence maps possible process injection to T1055.
- Saved telemetry indicates activity targeting lsass.exe.
- T1543.002 and T1562.001 suggest service-related and defense-evasion behavior.
- The archive uses long sleeps and checks the CPU or debugging environment.
- All 10 dropped children remain unclassified.
- No complete contacted-host reputation cross-check is available.
Quarantine the archive and verify its source and embedded executables before opening it. Keep endpoint protection enabled and use an isolated analysis environment if examination is necessary.
Coverage & freshness
Complete means the check returned a usable result. It does not mean the file is safe.
Antivirus
Complete2 of 75 engines flagged the file.
Sandbox
Complete1 isolated runtime environment contributed observations.
Network
Not runNo contacted-host reputation check is recorded.
No timestamp recordedYARA
Complete2 signature or behavior rules matched.
External intel
Complete3 of 3 independent reference sources completed.
Behavior
Plain-English impact first, then the observed runtime evidence.
Runtime flight recorder
Capture complete- 1isolated sandbox run
- 16MITRE ATT&CK techniques
- 9spawned processes
- 0network contacts
- 30filesystem & mutex artifacts
What this file does
Observed actions and their security significance
High concern: Injected code into another process, a technique that can conceal execution.
High concern: Created or modified a system service, which can keep code running.
High concern: Attempted to impair or bypass security controls.
Moderate concern: Removed execution artefacts or logs, which can conceal activity.
Moderate concern: Communicated over a common application protocol; malware can use this for command-and-control.
Moderate concern: Checked the environment for virtualisation or analysis tools.
Moderate concern: Checks which security software you have installed.
These are observed capabilities from an isolated analysis. A technique does not prove malicious intent on its own, and the file never ran on your device.
Attack story
Runtime observations grouped by analysis stage. Arrows organize the stages; they do not claim chronology or causality.
Input file
The submitted object
- FileObserved
kisskh.window.app.zip
cbc72ee3e3a337e10daad3940dce1afb77966218a5f3e71fb98bb075cc4a079a
01Uploaded file
Processes
Runtime execution
- ProcessObserved
Observed process
"C:\Windows\sysnative\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy bypass -File "C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\install.ps1"
02Isolated runtime analysis - ProcessObserved
Observed process
"C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\utils/pwainstaller.exe"
03Isolated runtime analysis - +1 more recorded observation in Analyst mode
Files
Created or changed
- Written fileObserved
Windows PowerShell.lnk
C:\Users\<USER>\Desktop\%AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Windows PowerShell\Windows PowerShell.lnk
04Isolated runtime analysis - Written fileObserved
P7ZR3E3UD71AIELP1U0F.temp
C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations\P7ZR3E3UD71AIELP1U0F.temp
05Isolated runtime analysis - +1 more recorded observation in Analyst mode
5 recorded facts from one runtime window. Every fact remains independently traceable in Analyst mode.
What this file did when executed
This file was detonated in 1 sandbox and its runtime behaviour was observed.
Adversary techniques mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
- HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SYSTEM\ControlSet001\Services\W32Time\Config\LastKnownGoodTime
- C:\Users\<USER>\Desktop\%AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Windows PowerShell\Windows PowerShell.lnk
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations\P7ZR3E3UD71AIELP1U0F.temp
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations\590aee7bdd69b59b.customDestinations-ms
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations\590aee7bdd69b59b.customDestinations-ms~RFbc6a.TMP
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Microsoft\PenWorkspace\DiscoverCacheData.dat
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations\590aee7bdd69b59b.customDestinations-ms~RFbc6a.TMP
- C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Network\Downloader\res1.log
- C:\ProgramData\Microsoft\Network\Downloader\res2.log
- C:\Windows\System32\config\systemprofile\AppData\Local\Microsoft\Windows\Caches\{AFBF9F1A-8EE8-4C77-AF34-C647E37CA0D9}.1.ver0x0000000000000000.db
- /var/lib/fwupd/gnupg/.#lk0x0000555d2b875b80.buffalo.3584
Files this sample writes at runtime
This file drops 10 children at runtime. None are currently flagged malicious in our cache.
- 96ad1146eb96877eab59…87dcf7Never scannednever seen before
- 586a7c9f67010402ed7f…7d3bb4Never scannednever seen before
- 112091b0b08d531a1409…a66e9fNever scannednever seen before
- 77653aa4858a4b046929…0f17fdNever scannednever seen before
- e7d1d91a64ceb02d7800…5785beNever scannednever seen before
- c92018d62de8e893c6d1…e600abNever scannednever seen before
- 73b0b575b559740ab990…a8d85aNever scannednever seen before
- 14ae6b7becc11a2aed65…5a4ac2Never scannednever seen before
- decb77a6331589e8c391…420fd4Never scannednever seen before
- ccf5c0339b5129a41b0c…b87227Never scannednever seen before
Detection & Forensics
Consensus, attribution, signatures, code structure, prevalence, and identity.
Evidence integrity
Chain of custody for the facts preserved in this report.
- 2rule hits recorded
- 2 / 75engines flagged
- 79sources in submission history
Why these facts are shown
Each statement identifies whether it was directly recorded or derived from saved scan facts.
- 01
1 high-confidence signature or behavior rule matched this file.
Verdict inputView chapterProvenanceDerivedSourceSignature and behavior rulesObserved at - 02
2 of 75 antivirus engines flagged the file, including Jiangmin and MaxSecure.
Verdict inputView chapterProvenanceObservedSourceAntivirus analysisObserved at - 03
The hash has been submitted 86 times from 79 sources.
ProvenanceDerivedSourceSaved report factsObserved at - 04
Scanned file: kisskh.window.app.zip — cbc72ee3e3a337e10daad3940dce1afb77966218a5f3e71fb98bb075cc4a079a
ProvenanceObservedSourceUploaded fileObserved at - 05
Observed process — "C:\Windows\sysnative\WindowsPowerShell\v1.0\powershell.exe" -NoProfile -ExecutionPolicy bypass -File "C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\install.ps1"
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 06
Observed process — "C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\utils/pwainstaller.exe"
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 07
File written: Windows PowerShell.lnk — C:\Users\<USER>\Desktop\%AppData%\Microsoft\Windows\Start Menu\Programs\Windows PowerShell\Windows PowerShell.lnk
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 08
File written: P7ZR3E3UD71AIELP1U0F.temp — C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Roaming\Microsoft\Windows\Recent\CustomDestinations\P7ZR3E3UD71AIELP1U0F.temp
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at
Detection sources at a glance
The available sources did not agree on a named threat category.
MalwareBazaar, YARAify, and CIRCL hashlookup completed and returned no entries for this hash.
Signatures and behavior heuristics
A community signature or high-severity behavioral heuristic matched. Signatures identify known patterns; heuristics are strong leads but are not proof on their own.
The saved runtime evidence maps this activity to MITRE T1055 (Process Injection). The mapping supports possible process injection, but it does not prove the exact injection method or the operator's intent.
EvidenceC:\Windows\Explorer.EXESandbox observed process activity targeting LSASS (Windows credential store). Legitimate software has no business reading LSASS memory — this is Mimikatz-shape behaviour.
EvidenceC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exe
2 of 75 engines flagged this file
View all 75 engine results
PE structure
Not applicablePE structure analysis applies to Windows executable formats, not this file type.
How widely this file has been seen
Moderate prevalence — neither rare nor common. No strong prior applies.
Fingerprint and provenance
- File name
- kisskh.window.app.zip
- Format
- ZIP
- Code signing
- Not applicable to this file type
- Size
- 1.6 MB
- Last analyzed
- Oct 6, 2026, 10:07 PM UTC
cbc72ee3e3a337e10daad3940dce1afb77966218a5f3e71fb98bb075cc4a079aSafety & FAQ
Complete recovery guidance and answers for the next decision.
What to do now
We couldn't fully clear this file. Treat it with caution.
- Recovery step 01
Don't open or extract it unless you're certain it came from a source you trust.
- Recovery step 02
Check where you got it — an unexpected attachment or a random download link is a red flag.
- Recovery step 03
If its origin cannot be confirmed, delete this archive and use a fresh copy from a trusted source. Get a fresh copy from the original trusted source and verify its exact hash when possible.
- Recovery step 04
If you're still unsure, scan it again in a day or two — detections often catch up on newer files.
Safety FAQ
Direct answers grounded in the saved verdict and evidence in this report.
Is kisskh.window.app.zip safe, or is it malware?
What is kisskh.window.app.zip?
How many antivirus engines detected kisskh.window.app.zip?
I already downloaded and opened or extracted kisskh.window.app.zip — what should I do?
How do I remove kisskh.window.app.zip?
What is the SHA-256 hash of kisskh.window.app.zip?
How up to date is this analysis of kisskh.window.app.zip?
Community
Member reviews and reports for this exact file hash.