Is MoonWatch.zip safe?
ZIP archive containing multiple PE/ELF/Mach-O binaries that triggered six tier-1 engines and exhibited process-injection plus direct-IP behaviour.
14 of 75 engines flagged the archive, six of them tier-1. Sandbox logs show process injection (T1055) and direct-IP traffic to seven addresses, yet no named family consensus or malicious child files were confirmed.
f1106c03fb393ad4fe…98d571e2f2b14aRecommended next actions
Before opening or extracting
Do not open or extract it until the source can be verified independently.
If you already opened or extracted it
Stop using it, scan the device, and watch for unexpected behavior or security alerts. Get a fresh copy from the original trusted source and verify its exact hash when possible.
Intelligence
The saved assessment, checked against the scan evidence and recorded coverage.
The reasoning behind this verdict
This section explains the evidence supporting the verdict and keeps conflicting or missing signals visible.
14 of 75 engines flagged the archive, six of them tier-1. Sandbox logs show process injection (T1055) and direct-IP traffic to seven addresses, yet no named family consensus or malicious child files were confirmed.
The combination of tier-1 detections, offensive MITRE techniques, and direct-IP contacts outweighs the lack of a strong family consensus and the absence of malicious dropped children. Because the file is only one day old and has no prior history, the evidence is mixed rather than decisive. The missing contacted-hosts reputation check further limits certainty.
What We Detected
Archive contains PE, ELF and Mach-O binaries. Six tier-7 engines (Avast, AVG, Avira, F-Secure, Kaspersky, Sophos, TrendMicro) reported malicious or PUA labels; one engine named a WinDivert-related family. Sandbox execution recorded rundll32 loading several .NET DLLs and seven direct-IP connections.
Threat Behavior
Observed MITRE techniques include process injection (T1055), service creation (T1543.002) and defense-evasion (T1562.001). No persistence registry keys or mutexes were created. Ten dropped children remain unclassified.
What To Do Now
Do not execute the archive. Keep endpoint protection enabled. If the file is required, submit it to a controlled analysis environment and monitor for C2 traffic to the observed IPs.
Where this verdict could be wrong2 caveats
- engines.tier1FamilyConsensus.strong=false (only 1 engine on malwarex family)
- droppedChildren.hasMaliciousChild=false and 10/10 children unknown
These are the assessment's weak points. If you believe one applies to your file, report the verdict and we'll re-review it.
- No malicious dropped children
- No strong tier-1 family consensus
- No external-intel hits
- Six tier-1 engines flagged the sample
- Process-injection technique observed
- Direct-IP traffic to seven addresses
- Rare and newly submitted file
Treat as suspicious; block or sandbox until contacted-host reputation and further child-file analysis are available.
Coverage & freshness
Complete means the check returned a usable result. It does not mean the file is safe.
Antivirus
Complete14 of 75 engines flagged the file.
Sandbox
Complete1 isolated runtime environment contributed observations.
Network
Partial7 runtime contacts were observed without a completed reputation cross-check.
YARA
Complete2 signature or behavior rules matched.
External intel
Complete3 of 3 independent reference sources completed.
Behavior
Plain-English impact first, then the observed runtime evidence.
Runtime flight recorder
Capture complete- 1isolated sandbox run
- 15MITRE ATT&CK techniques
- 15spawned processes
- 7network contacts
- 15filesystem & mutex artifacts
What this file does
Observed actions and their security significance
High concern: Injected code into another process, a technique that can conceal execution.
High concern: Created or modified a system service, which can keep code running.
High concern: Attempted to impair or bypass security controls.
High concern: Manipulated how the operating system loads code, which can redirect execution.
Moderate concern: Removed execution artefacts or logs, which can conceal activity.
Moderate concern: Communicated over a common application protocol; malware can use this for command-and-control.
Moderate concern: Scans through your files and folders.
These are observed capabilities from an isolated analysis. A technique does not prove malicious intent on its own, and the file never ran on your device.
Attack story
Runtime observations grouped by analysis stage. Arrows organize the stages; they do not claim chronology or causality.
Input file
The submitted object
- FileObserved
MoonWatch.zip
f1106c03fb393ad4fe62227639934d4994dde2d194c58847bd98d571e2f2b14a
01Uploaded file
Processes
Runtime execution
- ProcessObserved
Observed process
"C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe" "C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\MoonWatch 1.1.1/ComposableAsync.Core.dll",#1
02Isolated runtime analysis - ProcessObserved
Observed process
"C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe" "C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\MoonWatch 1.1.1/DotNetBungieAPI.dll",#1
03Isolated runtime analysis - +1 more recorded observation in Analyst mode
Files
Created or changed
- Written fileObserved
unarchiver.log
C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\unarchiver.log
04Isolated runtime analysis - Written fileObserved
z04c35i0.pk4
C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\z04c35i0.pk4
05Isolated runtime analysis - +1 more recorded observation in Analyst mode
Network
Hosts contacted
- Contacted hostObserved
23.11.32.159
Contact observed during runtime.
06Isolated runtime analysis - Contacted hostObserved
184.28.164.23
Contact observed during runtime.
07Isolated runtime analysis - +1 more recorded observation in Analyst mode
7 recorded facts from one runtime window. Every fact remains independently traceable in Analyst mode.
What this file did when executed
This file was detonated in 1 sandbox and its runtime behaviour was observed.
Adversary techniques mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
- 23.11.32.159
- 184.28.164.23
- 184.28.164.187
- 17.137.162.3
- 184.29.31.10
- 18.224.99.8
- 100.28.198.221
- C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\unarchiver.log
- C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\z04c35i0.pk4
- C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\z04c35i0.pk4\MoonWatch 1.1.1
- C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\z04c35i0.pk4\MoonWatch 1.1.1\Ahk
- C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\z04c35i0.pk4\MoonWatch 1.1.1\ComposableAsync.Core.dll
Files this sample writes at runtime
This file drops 10 children at runtime. None are currently flagged malicious in our cache.
- b0f5c48026fedcf9f05c…c18a07Never scannednever seen before
- 43d27adbc5ba40850bac…fb5746Never scannednever seen before
- ac1146e68d53d56b79e9…96b93eNever scannednever seen before
- 46826fd3b68bd23028b2…143a43Never scannednever seen before
- 647b7b5886526691aed5…250db1Never scannednever seen before
- c64ae8d44dc3e1aa03ac…cf0f21Never scannednever seen before
- d82421a7036109556106…c66e7eNever scannednever seen before
- d2d85721e191d9bc6f64…23bc7dNever scannednever seen before
- acb89dff050d681fab6f…a26933Never scannednever seen before
- 815ce410c9eab531dd21…497b0bNever scannednever seen before
Detection & Forensics
Consensus, attribution, signatures, code structure, prevalence, and identity.
Evidence integrity
Chain of custody for the facts preserved in this report.
- 2rule hits recorded
- 14 / 75engines flagged
- 2sources in submission history
Why these facts are shown
Each statement identifies whether it was directly recorded or derived from saved scan facts.
- 01
1 high-confidence signature or behavior rule matched this file.
Verdict inputView chapterProvenanceDerivedSourceSignature and behavior rulesObserved at - 02
14 of 75 antivirus engines flagged the file, including Avast and AVG.
Verdict inputView chapterProvenanceObservedSourceAntivirus analysisObserved at - 03
The hash has been submitted 2 times from 2 sources.
ProvenanceDerivedSourceSaved report factsObserved at - 04
Scanned file: MoonWatch.zip — f1106c03fb393ad4fe62227639934d4994dde2d194c58847bd98d571e2f2b14a
ProvenanceObservedSourceUploaded fileObserved at - 05
Observed process — "C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe" "C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\MoonWatch 1.1.1/ComposableAsync.Core.dll",#1
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 06
Observed process — "C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe" "C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\MoonWatch 1.1.1/DotNetBungieAPI.dll",#1
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 07
File written: unarchiver.log — C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\unarchiver.log
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 08
File written: z04c35i0.pk4 — C:\Users\user\AppData\Local\Temp\z04c35i0.pk4
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 09
Contacted host: 23.11.32.159 — Contact observed during runtime.
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 10
Contacted host: 184.28.164.23 — Contact observed during runtime.
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at
Detection sources at a glance
The available sources did not agree on a named threat category.
MalwareBazaar, YARAify, and CIRCL hashlookup completed and returned no entries for this hash.
Signatures and behavior heuristics
A community signature or high-severity behavioral heuristic matched. Signatures identify known patterns; heuristics are strong leads but are not proof on their own.
The saved runtime evidence maps this activity to MITRE T1055 (Process Injection). The mapping supports possible process injection, but it does not prove the exact injection method or the operator's intent.
Evidence"C:\Windows\system32\rundll32.exe" "C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\Temp\MoonWatch 1.1.1/ComposableAsync.Core.dll",#1The sample contacted an external IP address directly and no application domain was recorded. Direct-IP traffic also occurs in legitimate installers and infrastructure, so this is supporting context only and requires corroboration from host reputation and other runtime evidence.
Evidence23.11.32.159 · 184.28.164.23 · 184.28.164.187
14 of 75 engines flagged this file
View all 75 engine results
PE structure
Not applicablePE structure analysis applies to Windows executable formats, not this file type.
How widely this file has been seen
Barely seen in the wild and first surfaced recently. 14 antivirus detections make that low prevalence materially relevant, but rarity alone is not proof of malware.
Fingerprint and provenance
- File name
- MoonWatch.zip
- Format
- ZIP
- Code signing
- Not applicable to this file type
- Size
- 26.7 MB
- Last analyzed
- Aug 25, 2026, 6:43 AM UTC
f1106c03fb393ad4fe62227639934d4994dde2d194c58847bd98d571e2f2b14aSafety & FAQ
Complete recovery guidance and answers for the next decision.
What to do now
We couldn't fully clear this file. Treat it with caution.
- Recovery step 01
Don't open or extract it unless you're certain it came from a source you trust.
- Recovery step 02
Check where you got it — an unexpected attachment or a random download link is a red flag.
- Recovery step 03
If its origin cannot be confirmed, delete this archive and use a fresh copy from a trusted source. Get a fresh copy from the original trusted source and verify its exact hash when possible.
- Recovery step 04
If you're still unsure, scan it again in a day or two — detections often catch up on newer files.
Safety FAQ
Direct answers grounded in the saved verdict and evidence in this report.
Is MoonWatch.zip safe, or is it malware?
What is MoonWatch.zip?
How many antivirus engines detected MoonWatch.zip?
I already downloaded and opened or extracted MoonWatch.zip — what should I do?
How do I remove MoonWatch.zip?
What is the SHA-256 hash of MoonWatch.zip?
How up to date is this analysis of MoonWatch.zip?
Community
Member reviews and reports for this exact file hash.