Is Nexomia.exe safe?
Unsigned 17 MB executable shows sandbox evidence of process injection, LSASS access, and direct-IP traffic despite zero AV detections.
Seventy-five engines returned no detections, yet sandbox telemetry recorded three offensive MITRE techniques including T1055 process injection and LSASS credential-store access. The file is unsigned, has medium prevalence, and contacted one external IP whose reputation could not be checked because contactedHosts is null.
35aec247abc007311e…6cdefe68df5fa7Recommended next actions
Before running
Do not run it until the source and publisher can be verified independently.
If you already ran it
Stop using it, scan the device, and watch for unexpected behavior or security alerts. Get a fresh copy from the developer's official site or an official app store.
Intelligence
The saved assessment, checked against the scan evidence and recorded coverage.
The reasoning behind this verdict
This section explains the evidence supporting the verdict and keeps conflicting or missing signals visible.
Seventy-five engines returned no detections, yet sandbox telemetry recorded three offensive MITRE techniques including T1055 process injection and LSASS credential-store access. The file is unsigned, has medium prevalence, and contacted one external IP whose reputation could not be checked because contactedHosts is null.
Zero engine detections normally point toward safe, but the sandbox captured T1055, T1485, and T1562.001 activity that legitimate software rarely performs. The unsigned status removes any trusted-publisher safety net, and the incomplete no complete contacted-host reputation result was available-network conclusion. Medium prevalence and absence of RAG history leave the sample in mixed-signal territory rather than a decisive verdict.
What We Detected
Seventy-five antivirus engines scanned the 17 MB Win32 executable and returned zero malicious or suspicious flags. Sandbox execution, however, recorded process-injection behaviour (T1055), data-destruction attempts (T1485), and defence-evasion actions (T1562.001). The sample wrote multiple EdgeWebView cache files and contacted the IP 150.171.28.11 directly without a domain name.
Threat Behavior
LSASS memory access and direct-IP outbound traffic are techniques commonly associated with credential-dumping or command-and-control activity. No dropped children were flagged malicious, and external-intel sources (CIRCL, MalwareBazaar, YARAify) produced no hits. The file remains unsigned, so there is no code-signing history to corroborate legitimacy.
What To Do Now
Do not run the executable on production systems. Keep endpoint protection enabled and consider submitting the sample to a controlled analysis environment for deeper behavioural inspection. Monitor any systems that have already executed it for unusual outbound traffic or credential-store access attempts.
Where this verdict could be wrong1 caveat
- contactedHosts=null means host-reputation cross-check was not completed; cannot treat the single IP contact as confirmed malicious.
These are the assessment's weak points. If you believe one applies to your file, report the verdict and we'll re-review it.
- Zero detections across 75 engines
- Medium prevalence (853 sources)
- No malicious dropped children
- No external-intel hits
- Unsigned executable
- Sandbox observed T1055 process injection
- Sandbox observed LSASS access (T1003.001 implied)
- Direct-IP contact with no domain recorded
- contactedHosts reputation check incomplete
Treat the file as untrusted; run it only in an isolated analysis environment until additional host-reputation or behavioural evidence clarifies its intent.
Coverage & freshness
Complete means the check returned a usable result. It does not mean the file is safe.
Antivirus
Complete0 of 75 engines flagged the file.
Sandbox
Complete1 isolated runtime environment contributed observations.
Network
Partial1 runtime contact was observed without a completed reputation cross-check.
YARA
Complete3 signature or behavior rules matched.
External intel
Complete3 of 3 independent reference sources completed.
Behavior
Plain-English impact first, then the observed runtime evidence.
Runtime flight recorder
Capture complete- 1isolated sandbox run
- 20MITRE ATT&CK techniques
- 15spawned processes
- 1network contacts
- 37filesystem & mutex artifacts
What this file does
Observed actions and their security significance
High concern: Injected code into another process, a technique that can conceal execution.
High concern: Used an input-capture technique that can record credentials or keystrokes.
High concern: Attempted to impair or bypass security controls.
High concern: Manipulated how the operating system loads code, which can redirect execution.
Moderate concern: Contained obfuscated or packed code that makes inspection harder.
Moderate concern: Runs hidden system commands (script or shell).
Moderate concern: Communicated over a common application protocol; malware can use this for command-and-control.
These are observed capabilities from an isolated analysis. A technique does not prove malicious intent on its own, and the file never ran on your device.
Attack story
Runtime observations grouped by analysis stage. Arrows organize the stages; they do not claim chronology or causality.
Input file
The submitted object
- FileObserved
Nexomia.exe
35aec247abc007311e3f3584157ca1da956d307eee57c9ced36cdefe68df5fa7
01Uploaded file
Processes
Runtime execution
- ProcessObserved
Observed process
"C:\Users\<USER>\Desktop\executable.exe"
02Isolated runtime analysis - ProcessObserved
Observed process
"C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\122.0.2365.92\msedgewebview2.exe" --embedded-browser-webview=1 --webview-exe-name=executable.exe --webview-exe-version=0.1.2 --user-data-dir="C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView" --noerrdialogs --embedded-browser-webview-dpi-awareness=2 --edge-webview-custom-scheme --autoplay-policy=no-user-gesture-required --disable-features=msWebOOUI,msPdfOOUI,msSmartScreenProtection --enable-features=MojoIpcz --lang=en-US --accept-lang=en-US --mojo-named-platform-channel-pipe=4916.2020.10160635389368155988
03Isolated runtime analysis - +1 more recorded observation in Analyst mode
Files
Created or changed
- Written fileObserved
throttle_store.dat
C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\Crashpad\throttle_store.dat
04Isolated runtime analysis - Written fileObserved
settings.dat
C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\Crashpad\settings.dat
05Isolated runtime analysis - +1 more recorded observation in Analyst mode
Network
Hosts contacted
- Contacted hostObserved
150.171.28.11
Contact observed during runtime.
06Isolated runtime analysis
6 recorded facts from one runtime window. Every fact remains independently traceable in Analyst mode.
What this file did when executed
This file was detonated in 1 sandbox and its runtime behaviour was observed.
Adversary techniques mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
- 150.171.28.11
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\Crashpad\throttle_store.dat
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\Crashpad\settings.dat
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\BrowserMetrics\BrowserMetrics-6A651005-15B4.pma
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\lockfile
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\Variations
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\BrowserMetrics-spare.pma
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\619b8961-ae40-41e2-9680-7ab4b4f6a603.tmp
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\Default\Site Characteristics Database\000001.dbtmp
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\Default\Sync Data\LevelDB\000001.dbtmp
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\Default\shared_proto_db\000001.dbtmp
- Local\ChromeProcessSingletonStartup!
- __OMADM_NAMED_MUTEX__
- Global\OneSettingQueryMutex+compat+encapsulation
- \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\DBWinMutex
- \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Local\ChromeProcessSingletonStartup!
Files this sample writes at runtime
This file drops 10 children at runtime. None are currently flagged malicious in our cache.
- d228f3ff50f72aafe2e6…a45ff0Never scannednever seen before
- fbcfe23a2ecb82b7100c…dc0f2dNever scannednever seen before
- d7ad2ea8184b8b99fc7f…2a0078Never scannednever seen before
- 8920bda5193391b83a6f…24384cNever scannednever seen before
- a0c9abae18599f0a65fc…e38e87Never scannednever seen before
- b1e963d702392fb72247…c0cdecNever scannednever seen before
- 5dfc321417fc31359f23…4a2026Never scannednever seen before
- 0f1bad70c7bd1e0a6956…780443Never scannednever seen before
- 3d9e9b729545ca0806d4…4d079eNever scannednever seen before
- c911f3d7a154dd36e040…797221Never scannednever seen before
Detection & Forensics
Consensus, attribution, signatures, code structure, prevalence, and identity.
Evidence integrity
Chain of custody for the facts preserved in this report.
- 3rule hits recorded
- 0 / 75engines flagged
- 853sources in submission history
Why these facts are shown
Each statement identifies whether it was directly recorded or derived from saved scan facts.
- 01
1 high-confidence signature or behavior rule matched this file.
Verdict inputView chapterProvenanceDerivedSourceSignature and behavior rulesObserved at - 02
0 of 75 antivirus engines flagged the file.
ProvenanceObservedSourceAntivirus analysisObserved at - 03
The hash has been submitted 1,010 times from 853 sources.
ProvenanceDerivedSourceSaved report factsObserved at - 04
Scanned file: Nexomia.exe — 35aec247abc007311e3f3584157ca1da956d307eee57c9ced36cdefe68df5fa7
ProvenanceObservedSourceUploaded fileObserved at - 05
Observed process — "C:\Users\<USER>\Desktop\executable.exe"
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 06
Observed process — "C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\122.0.2365.92\msedgewebview2.exe" --embedded-browser-webview=1 --webview-exe-name=executable.exe --webview-exe-version=0.1.2 --user-data-dir="C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView" --noerrdialogs --embedded-browser-webview-dpi-awareness=2 --edge-webview-custom-scheme --autoplay-policy=no-user-gesture-required --disable-features=msWebOOUI,msPdfOOUI,msSmartScreenProtection --enable-features=MojoIpcz --lang=en-US --accept-lang=en-US --mojo-named-platform-channel-pipe=4916.2020.10160635389368155988
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 07
File written: throttle_store.dat — C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\Crashpad\throttle_store.dat
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 08
File written: settings.dat — C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\Crashpad\settings.dat
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 09
Contacted host: 150.171.28.11 — Contact observed during runtime.
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at
Detection sources at a glance
The available sources did not agree on a named threat category.
MalwareBazaar, YARAify, and CIRCL hashlookup completed and returned no entries for this hash.
Signatures and behavior heuristics
A community signature or high-severity behavioral heuristic matched. Signatures identify known patterns; heuristics are strong leads but are not proof on their own.
The saved runtime evidence maps this activity to MITRE T1055 (Process Injection). The mapping supports possible process injection, but it does not prove the exact injection method or the operator's intent.
EvidenceC:\Windows\System32\svchost.exe -k NetworkService -pSandbox observed process activity targeting LSASS (Windows credential store). Legitimate software has no business reading LSASS memory — this is Mimikatz-shape behaviour.
EvidenceC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeThe sample contacted an external IP address directly and no application domain was recorded. Direct-IP traffic also occurs in legitimate installers and infrastructure, so this is supporting context only and requires corroboration from host reputation and other runtime evidence.
Evidence150.171.28.11
0 of 75 engines flagged this file
View all 75 engine results
Section entropy & packers
No high-entropy executable section or known packer signature was detected. Data and resource sections can still have high entropy without indicating packed code.
How widely this file has been seen
Moderate prevalence — neither rare nor common. No strong prior applies.
Fingerprint and provenance
- File name
- Nexomia.exe
- Format
- Win32 EXE
- Code signing
- No verified publisher
- Size
- 16.5 MB
- Last analyzed
- Aug 25, 2026, 12:02 AM UTC
35aec247abc007311e3f3584157ca1da956d307eee57c9ced36cdefe68df5fa7Safety & FAQ
Complete recovery guidance and answers for the next decision.
What to do now
We couldn't fully clear this file. Treat it with caution.
- Recovery step 01
Don't run it unless you're certain it came from a source you trust.
- Recovery step 02
Check where you got it — an unexpected attachment or a random download link is a red flag.
- Recovery step 03
If its origin cannot be confirmed, delete this file and use a fresh copy from a trusted source. Get a fresh copy from the developer's official site or an official app store.
- Recovery step 04
If you're still unsure, scan it again in a day or two — detections often catch up on newer files.
Safety FAQ
Direct answers grounded in the saved verdict and evidence in this report.
Is Nexomia.exe safe, or is it malware?
What is Nexomia.exe?
How many antivirus engines detected Nexomia.exe?
I already downloaded and ran Nexomia.exe — what should I do?
How do I remove Nexomia.exe?
What is the SHA-256 hash of Nexomia.exe?
How up to date is this analysis of Nexomia.exe?
Community
Member reviews and reports for this exact file hash.