Is Nexomia.exe safe?
Unsigned executable with sandbox-detected process injection and LSASS access but zero engine detections.
No antivirus engine flagged the file, yet the sandbox recorded process-injection, LSASS access, and direct-IP traffic. The combination of unsigned code and offensive MITRE techniques without corroborating detections places the sample in mixed-signals territory.
63fcce4d5724b6afa7…c04bf189d59f42Recommended next actions
Before running
Do not run it until the source and publisher can be verified independently.
If you already ran it
Stop using it, scan the device, and watch for unexpected behavior or security alerts. Get a fresh copy from the developer's official site or an official app store.
Intelligence
The saved assessment, checked against the scan evidence and recorded coverage.
The reasoning behind this verdict
This section explains the evidence supporting the verdict and keeps conflicting or missing signals visible.
No antivirus engine flagged the file, yet the sandbox recorded process-injection, LSASS access, and direct-IP traffic. The combination of unsigned code and offensive MITRE techniques without corroborating detections places the sample in mixed-signals territory.
Zero detections across 75 engines and no tier-1 consensus argue against a malicious verdict. However, the sandbox recorded three offensive techniques (T1055, T1485, T1562.001) and direct-IP connections, while the file remains unsigned and lacks any prior reputation. contactedHosts is null, so the two observed no complete contacted-host reputation result was available. The absence of external-intel hits and similar-hash history leaves the evidence balanced between benign and suspicious.
What We Detected
75 engines reported the sample clean; none assigned a malicious label. The file is unsigned and first seen today. Sandbox execution produced three MITRE techniques normally associated with malware: process injection (T1055), data destruction (T1485), and defense-evasion (T1562.001). Two direct IP addresses were contacted and LSASS memory was accessed.
Threat Behavior
Static and dynamic evidence conflict. No engine or external-intel source labels the binary malicious, yet the runtime indicators match credential-dumping and injection patterns. Without host-reputation results or prior samples, the true intent cannot be confirmed.
What To Do Now
Keep endpoint protection enabled. Do not run the file on production systems until additional reputation data or a signed vendor release becomes available. Submit the sample to multiple sandboxes for further behavioral logging.
Where this verdict could be wrong1 caveat
- Sandbox observed LSASS access and direct-IP traffic, but no tier-1 engine or external-intel corroboration exists.
These are the assessment's weak points. If you believe one applies to your file, report the verdict and we'll re-review it.
- Zero detections across 75 engines
- No tier-1 malicious consensus
- No external-intel hits
- Unsigned executable
- Sandbox observed LSASS access
- Direct-IP connections without domain names
- Offensive MITRE techniques recorded
Treat as suspicious pending further reputation or signing information; maintain all security software in an enabled state.
Coverage & freshness
Complete means the check returned a usable result. It does not mean the file is safe.
Antivirus
Complete0 of 75 engines flagged the file.
Sandbox
Complete1 isolated runtime environment contributed observations.
Network
Partial2 runtime contacts were observed without a completed reputation cross-check.
YARA
Complete3 signature or behavior rules matched.
External intel
Complete3 of 3 independent reference sources completed.
Behavior
Plain-English impact first, then the observed runtime evidence.
Runtime flight recorder
Capture complete- 1isolated sandbox run
- 19MITRE ATT&CK techniques
- 15spawned processes
- 2network contacts
- 39filesystem & mutex artifacts
What this file does
Observed actions and their security significance
High concern: Injected code into another process, a technique that can conceal execution.
High concern: Used an input-capture technique that can record credentials or keystrokes.
High concern: Attempted to impair or bypass security controls.
High concern: Manipulated how the operating system loads code, which can redirect execution.
Moderate concern: Contained obfuscated or packed code that makes inspection harder.
Moderate concern: Runs hidden system commands (script or shell).
Moderate concern: Communicated over a common application protocol; malware can use this for command-and-control.
These are observed capabilities from an isolated analysis. A technique does not prove malicious intent on its own, and the file never ran on your device.
Attack story
Runtime observations grouped by analysis stage. Arrows organize the stages; they do not claim chronology or causality.
Input file
The submitted object
- FileObserved
Nexomia.exe
63fcce4d5724b6afa75316fe86f750b32c137201f872721d06c04bf189d59f42
01Uploaded file
Processes
Runtime execution
- ProcessObserved
Observed process
"C:\Users\<USER>\Desktop\Nexomia.exe"
02Isolated runtime analysis - ProcessObserved
Observed process
"C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\122.0.2365.92\msedgewebview2.exe" --embedded-browser-webview=1 --webview-exe-name=Nexomia.exe --webview-exe-version=0.3.2 --user-data-dir="C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView" --noerrdialogs --embedded-browser-webview-dpi-awareness=2 --edge-webview-custom-scheme --disable-cache --disable-features=msPasswordReveal,msPasswordManager,msAutofillSavePasswords,msAutofillPasswordsInInputs,msSmartScreenProtection --enable-features=MojoIpcz --lang=en-US --accept-lang=en-US --mojo-named-platform-channel-pipe=464.4464.6050870134762654667
03Isolated runtime analysis - +1 more recorded observation in Analyst mode
Files
Created or changed
- Written fileObserved
throttle_store.dat
C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\Crashpad\throttle_store.dat
04Isolated runtime analysis - Written fileObserved
settings.dat
C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\Crashpad\settings.dat
05Isolated runtime analysis - +1 more recorded observation in Analyst mode
Network
Hosts contacted
- Contacted hostObserved
150.171.29.11
Contact observed during runtime.
06Isolated runtime analysis - Contacted hostObserved
162.159.36.2
Contact observed during runtime.
07Isolated runtime analysis - +1 more recorded observation in Analyst mode
7 recorded facts from one runtime window. Every fact remains independently traceable in Analyst mode.
What this file did when executed
This file was detonated in 1 sandbox and its runtime behaviour was observed.
Adversary techniques mapped to the MITRE ATT&CK framework.
- 150.171.29.11
- 162.159.36.2
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\Crashpad\throttle_store.dat
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\Crashpad\settings.dat
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\BrowserMetrics\BrowserMetrics-6A8E88E9-C44.pma
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\lockfile
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\Variations
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\BrowserMetrics-spare.pma
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\c3d02649-45c8-4416-b713-5cf93f68ab51.tmp
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\Default\Code Cache\wasm\index-dir\the-real-index
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\Default\Code Cache\js\index-dir\temp-index
- C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\Default\shared_proto_db\metadata\000001.dbtmp
- Global\Nexomia
- Local\ChromeProcessSingletonStartup!
- __OMADM_NAMED_MUTEX__
- Global\OneSettingQueryMutex+compat+encapsulation
- \Sessions\1\BaseNamedObjects\Global\Nexomia
Files this sample writes at runtime
This file drops 10 children at runtime. None are currently flagged malicious in our cache.
- fbcfe23a2ecb82b7100c…dc0f2dNever scannednever seen before
- b7ddfccac10bd725190f…901808Never scannednever seen before
- 3c03fe9319722066e664…d710ccNever scannednever seen before
- a0c9abae18599f0a65fc…e38e87Never scannednever seen before
- b1e963d702392fb72247…c0cdecNever scannednever seen before
- 5dfc321417fc31359f23…4a2026Never scannednever seen before
- 0f1bad70c7bd1e0a6956…780443Never scannednever seen before
- ed1f826ef3feea8454c1…b2e2faNever scannednever seen before
- 67f60739432d797c1028…727465Never scannednever seen before
- 3e8402ea9e94dfb34bfd…fda8c0Never scannednever seen before
Detection & Forensics
Consensus, attribution, signatures, code structure, prevalence, and identity.
Evidence integrity
Chain of custody for the facts preserved in this report.
- 3rule hits recorded
- 0 / 75engines flagged
- 11sources in submission history
Why these facts are shown
Each statement identifies whether it was directly recorded or derived from saved scan facts.
- 01
1 high-confidence signature or behavior rule matched this file.
Verdict inputView chapterProvenanceDerivedSourceSignature and behavior rulesObserved at - 02
0 of 75 antivirus engines flagged the file.
ProvenanceObservedSourceAntivirus analysisObserved at - 03
The hash has been submitted 15 times from 11 sources.
ProvenanceDerivedSourceSaved report factsObserved at - 04
Scanned file: Nexomia.exe — 63fcce4d5724b6afa75316fe86f750b32c137201f872721d06c04bf189d59f42
ProvenanceObservedSourceUploaded fileObserved at - 05
Observed process — "C:\Users\<USER>\Desktop\Nexomia.exe"
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 06
Observed process — "C:\Program Files (x86)\Microsoft\EdgeWebView\Application\122.0.2365.92\msedgewebview2.exe" --embedded-browser-webview=1 --webview-exe-name=Nexomia.exe --webview-exe-version=0.3.2 --user-data-dir="C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView" --noerrdialogs --embedded-browser-webview-dpi-awareness=2 --edge-webview-custom-scheme --disable-cache --disable-features=msPasswordReveal,msPasswordManager,msAutofillSavePasswords,msAutofillPasswordsInInputs,msSmartScreenProtection --enable-features=MojoIpcz --lang=en-US --accept-lang=en-US --mojo-named-platform-channel-pipe=464.4464.6050870134762654667
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 07
File written: throttle_store.dat — C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\Crashpad\throttle_store.dat
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 08
File written: settings.dat — C:\Users\<USER>\AppData\Local\win.nexomia\EBWebView\Crashpad\settings.dat
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 09
Contacted host: 150.171.29.11 — Contact observed during runtime.
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at - 10
Contacted host: 162.159.36.2 — Contact observed during runtime.
ProvenanceObservedSourceIsolated runtime analysisObserved at
Detection sources at a glance
The available sources did not agree on a named threat category.
MalwareBazaar, YARAify, and CIRCL hashlookup completed and returned no entries for this hash.
Signatures and behavior heuristics
A community signature or high-severity behavioral heuristic matched. Signatures identify known patterns; heuristics are strong leads but are not proof on their own.
The saved runtime evidence maps this activity to MITRE T1055 (Process Injection). The mapping supports possible process injection, but it does not prove the exact injection method or the operator's intent.
EvidenceC:\Windows\system32\svchost.exe -k UnistackSvcGroupSandbox observed process activity targeting LSASS (Windows credential store). Legitimate software has no business reading LSASS memory — this is Mimikatz-shape behaviour.
EvidenceC:\Windows\system32\lsass.exeThe sample contacted an external IP address directly and no application domain was recorded. Direct-IP traffic also occurs in legitimate installers and infrastructure, so this is supporting context only and requires corroboration from host reputation and other runtime evidence.
Evidence150.171.29.11 · 162.159.36.2
0 of 75 engines flagged this file
View all 75 engine results
Section entropy & packers
No high-entropy executable section or known packer signature was detected. Data and resource sections can still have high entropy without indicating packed code.
How widely this file has been seen
Moderate prevalence — neither rare nor common. No strong prior applies.
Fingerprint and provenance
- File name
- Nexomia.exe
- Format
- Win32 EXE
- Code signing
- No verified publisher
- Size
- 19.1 MB
- Last analyzed
- Aug 26, 2026, 6:51 AM UTC
63fcce4d5724b6afa75316fe86f750b32c137201f872721d06c04bf189d59f42Safety & FAQ
Complete recovery guidance and answers for the next decision.
What to do now
We couldn't fully clear this file. Treat it with caution.
- Recovery step 01
Don't run it unless you're certain it came from a source you trust.
- Recovery step 02
Check where you got it — an unexpected attachment or a random download link is a red flag.
- Recovery step 03
If its origin cannot be confirmed, delete this file and use a fresh copy from a trusted source. Get a fresh copy from the developer's official site or an official app store.
- Recovery step 04
If you're still unsure, scan it again in a day or two — detections often catch up on newer files.
Safety FAQ
Direct answers grounded in the saved verdict and evidence in this report.
Is Nexomia.exe safe, or is it malware?
What is Nexomia.exe?
How many antivirus engines detected Nexomia.exe?
I already downloaded and ran Nexomia.exe — what should I do?
How do I remove Nexomia.exe?
What is the SHA-256 hash of Nexomia.exe?
How up to date is this analysis of Nexomia.exe?
Community
Member reviews and reports for this exact file hash.